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In the past five years, public schools across the country have begun to explore a
new avenue of fundraising: selling naming rights to school facilities. The popularity
and monetary value of these sales, however, only highlight the importance of the
First Amendment concerns they raise. This Article uses school naming rights as a
lens through which to examine the conflicts between government speech, commercial
speech, and forum analysis, three categories of First Amendment analysis that are
simultaneously and problematically implicated by school naming rights sales. Courts
and scholars have long noted the internal ambiguities within these three categories,
but have not yet explored the sometimes irreconcilable conflicts among them. As the
growth of school naming rights shows, government sponsorship arrangements col-
lapse many of the artificial divisions between the First Amendment’s categories and
demonstrate the need for a better understanding of the categories’ interactions. This
Article identifies—and attempts to resolve—some of the border disputes between
these poorly defined and increasingly important areas of First Amendment law.
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INTRODUCTION
Like many public school administrators, Brooklawn School Board President
Bruce Darrow was stuck in a bind. His schools needed renovations, but his
budget was already stretched to the breaking point. Where most administrators
might have gone to the county or state government to ask for more funding,
however, Darrow hit on what seemed like a novel solution: He decided to sell
the naming rights to the elementary school gym. Darrow found a sponsor almost
immediately, and Brooklawn’s elementary students now play dodgeball in the
newly refurbished ShopRite of Brooklawn Center, named for the grocery store
that paid $100,000 to help remodel it.1 School boards across the country soon
followed Brooklawn’s lead, entering into naming rights deals whose combined
value now stretches into the hundreds of millions of dollars.
1. Tamar Lewin, In Public Schools, The Name Game as a Donor Lure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at
A1; Robert Strauss, Education; P.S. (Your Name Here), N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2001, § 14 (New Jersey
Weekly), at 6.
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Even holding aside policy concerns, a closer look at these deals suggests that
school boards might inadvertently be steering themselves into troubled constitu-
tional waters. Specifically, schools might find it increasingly hard to reject
undesirable sponsors—“bad name” sponsors, or those marketing undesirable
products, for example—without running afoul of the First Amendment. Indeed,
the sale of public school naming rights creates something of a constitutional
perfect storm, uniquely positioned at the intersection of three particularly
tempestuous areas of First Amendment law: government speech, commercial
speech, and schoolhouse speech (a kind of forum analysis). Courts and scholars
have not yet acknowledged the shadow cast by this ominous storm. But as
school sponsorship deals become commonplace, it will be increasingly difficult
to ignore.
This Article represents a first attempt to analyze the First Amendment implica-
tions of school naming rights sales and the overlaps and interactions between
government speech, commercial speech, and schoolhouse speech. Scholars have
focused much attention on the characteristics that separate these three categories
from fully protected speech,2 but comparatively little scholarship has addressed
the boundaries and interactions among the categories themselves.3 The growth
2. Following Melville Nimmer’s lead, many First Amendment scholars have employed “definitional
balancing” or “categorical balancing” as a method for “defining which forms of speech are to be
regarded as ‘speech’ within the meaning of the first amendment.” Melville B. Nimmer, The Right To
Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56
CAL. L. REV. 935, 942 & n.24 (1968); see Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 46, 47 & n.3 (1987); Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095,
1138 n.175 (2005); see also John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categoriza-
tion and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1500–01 & n.74 (1975)
(describing a “categorization” approach). See generally Norman T. Deutsch, Professor Nimmer Meets
Professor Schauer (and Others): An Analysis of “Definitional Balancing” as a Methodology for
Determining the “Visible Boundaries of the First Amendment,” 39 AKRON L. REV. 483 (2006)
(examining “definitional balancing” as a method for separating protected and unprotected speech).
3. Perhaps the most thorough and nuanced work exploring the First Amendment’s boundaries—both
external and internal—is that of Frederick Schauer. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First
Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1765
(2004) [hereinafter Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment] (“The history of the First
Amendment is the history of its boundaries.”); Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amend-
ment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981) (exploring the use of categories and
subcategories in First Amendment methodology).
As part of his efforts to clarify the First Amendment’s boundaries, Schauer has described a theory of
the “institutional First Amendment,” which would “recognize the difference between the institutional
press and the lone pamphleteer, between the Internet and an adult theater, between libraries and medical
clinics, and between the National Endowment for the Arts and the National Institutes of Health.”
Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256, 1260 (2005)
[hereinafter Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment]; see also Frederick Schauer, Prin-
ciples, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1999). Although I do not address
the “institutional First Amendment” in any detail here, the basic thrust of this Article—that school
naming rights illuminate problematic interactions among three areas of First Amendment law—can
easily be reconciled with an institutional approach. Indeed, the discussion here suggests that these First
Amendment border disputes arise because of a new confluence of institutional actors: schools and
naming rights sponsors. For a more recent effort to address the strengths and potential weaknesses of
institutional tailoring, see generally Scott A. Moss, Prisoners and Students and Workers—Oh, My! A
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of public sponsorship deals such as school naming rights demands a better
understanding of these interactions. In an attempt to meet that need, this Article
creates a framework to analyze school naming rights specifically, and govern-
ment speech, commercial speech, and schoolhouse speech more generally. The
purpose of the Article is not to advocate for or against regulation of public
school naming rights, but rather to illuminate paths through the problematic
thicket of constitutional issues those regulations inevitably raise. In doing so, it
tries to clarify the boundaries between three previously independent categories
of First Amendment law that contemporary developments have put on an
inevitable collision course.
This collision will probably manifest itself in the form of First Amendment
challenges filed by would-be sponsors who argue that their rejection by a school
amounts to impermissible viewpoint discrimination and a violation of their First
Amendment rights. Given the financial value of school naming rights deals on
the one hand, and the strength of the opposition to those deals on the other,
sponsors and schools will likely wage pitched battles over the scope and
meaning of the First Amendment. These battles will raise important constitu-
tional questions that do not admit of easy answers.
Despite the First Amendment’s straightforward language—“Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech”4—the Amendment grants
varying protection to speech depending on the speaker, the message, and the
forum where the speech is delivered.5 As a result, courts recognize separate
categories of speech within the First Amendment’s coverage, each of which
receives a different level of protection.6 Government speech, commercial speech,
and schoolhouse speech, all of which are implicated in school naming rights
sales, are among the most volatile and controversial of these categories. All
three are subject to different and sometimes ill-defined definitions and stan-
dards. School naming rights arrangements highlight the practical difficulty of
applying these definitions and standards. When a school sells the naming rights
to its facilities, who is the “speaker”? Is it the school on which the name is
emblazoned, or the person or entity to whom the name belongs? And moreover,
what is the message being delivered? Is it a simple “thank you” to a benefactor,
Cautionary Note About Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L.
REV. (forthcoming 2007).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. Many scholars have called for a more evenhanded application of the Amendment in particular
categories. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech,
86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1384 (2001) (arguing that “there is no basis or need for any special form of
privilege or immunity for government speech”); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of
Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627 (1990); William Van Alstyne, To What Extent Does the Power
of Government To Determine the Boundaries and Conditions of Lawful Commerce Permit Government
To Declare Who May Advertise and Who May Not?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1513, 1554 (2002) [hereinafter Van
Alstyne, Power of Government].
6. Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment, supra note 3, at 1769–74 (distinguishing
between “coverage” and “protection” under the First Amendment).
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or a commercial advertising pitch? If the latter, is it the school or the sponsor
who is pushing the sponsor’s products? Even if those questions could be easily
resolved, they would leave the difficult problem of the forum: What does it
matter that these naming rights deals take place on public school grounds? And
perhaps most difficult of all, how are courts to resolve all of these questions at
once? This swirl of questions draws together the cloudy jurisprudence surround-
ing government speech, commercial speech, and schoolhouse speech, creating
the constitutional “storm” described here.
Part I of this Article describes recent trends in schoolhouse commercialism,
explaining how the growth of commercialism in schools throughout the 1980s
and 1990s led directly to the more recent practice of selling naming rights.
Because the categorization of “speech” for First Amendment purposes depends
on both the identity of the speaker and the content and purpose of the message
the speaker delivers, this Part explores not only the shape of naming rights
arrangements but also the motivations behind them. It concludes by identifying
the reasons why schools might want to limit naming rights or exclude certain
sponsors. Building on the practice and debate described in Part I, Part II
describes the actual policy approaches schools have used to try to control their
names. Though diverse in their approaches, these policies are uniformly blind to
the First Amendment problems they raise. It appears, in fact, that most naming
rights sales are made without reference to any written policy whatsoever,
putting school boards in a calamitously weak position to defend against the First
Amendment challenges they will inevitably face. Part III builds the constitu-
tional framework to assess these challenges. This final Part uses naming rights
as a tool to illuminate and clarify the tangled interactions among the govern-
ment speech, commercial speech, and schoolhouse speech doctrines. Embracing
a task that courts will soon have to perform, this Part attempts to resolve some
of the problematic interactions between the categories’ definitions and govern-
ing standards. It also argues that some of the overlaps among these three areas
of First Amendment law may be impossible to resolve, because the categories
themselves begin from fundamentally different premises. Although the First
Amendment is traditionally conceived as being divided by content alone,7 the
three subcategories addressed here actually divide themselves by somewhat
different metrics: government speech is defined and governed by the speaker’s
identity, commercial speech by the speech’s content, and schoolhouse speech by
the forum in which it is delivered. The simultaneous application of these
fundamentally different inquiries causes the border disputes this Article at-
tempts to resolve.
7. Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, supra note 3, at 1256 (“Traditionally, the
First Amendment has been subdivided on the basis of the content of the communication.”).
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I. FROM SPONSORSHIP TO NAMING RIGHTS: TRENDS AND ISSUES IN SCHOOLHOUSE
COMMERCIALISM
While the debate over school naming rights has thus far been driven by
concerns over policy and educational outcomes, the issues that animate that
policy discussion—including sponsor identity, motivation, and message—are
also necessary components of any First Amendment analysis. This first Part
gives a brief overview of the arguments for and against commerce in school
naming rights.
A. THE GROWTH OF SCHOOLHOUSE COMMERCIALISM
Schoolhouse commercialism is growing in nearly all its forms, from exclu-
sive pouring rights arrangements to sponsored classroom materials that mix
advertising with educational messages.8 One recent study found that schools
receive $2.4 billion a year from corporate relationships,9 more than the total
2003 educational expenditures of twelve states and the District of Columbia.10
The numbers for individual school districts can be staggering, rivaling the
amounts of funding they receive from taxes and other public sources.11
Opponents of schoolhouse commercialism bemoan what they see as public
schools “selling out” to corporate sponsors,12 and argue that children are
particularly vulnerable to harmful advertising.13 The most common targets of
these arguments are food and soda companies that market unhealthy snacks and
sodas to a student population already struggling with childhood obesity.14
Attempts to limit such marketing raise a host of difficult legal issues, however,15
and in any case, schools may find it difficult to forego the funds they receive
8. ALEX MOLNAR, EDUC. POL’Y STUDIES LAB., SPONSORED SCHOOLS AND COMMERCIALIZED CLASSROOMS:
SCHOOLHOUSE COMMERCIALIZING TRENDS IN THE 1990’S, at 6–7 (1998), available at http://epsl.asu.edu/ceru/
Annual%20reports/cace-98-01.pdf [hereinafter MOLNAR, SPONSORED SCHOOLS]; id. at 26 (“The evidence
presented in this report suggests that the 1990’s have become the decade of sponsored schools and
commercialized classrooms.”); see also Alex Molnar, Sixth Annual Report on Commercialism in
Schools: Cashing in on the Classroom, EDUC. LEADERSHIP, Dec. 2003–Jan. 2004, at 79, 79 [hereinafter
Molnar, Cashing in on the Classroom] (reporting “marked increase” in six categories of schoolhouse
commercialism from 2001–2002 to 2002–2003).
9. Molnar, Cashing in on the Classroom, supra note 8, at 79.
10. George A. Clowes, Just the Facts: Teacher Salaries and Education Spending, SCHOOL REFORM
NEWS, May 1, 2004, available at http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artId14818.
11. See, e.g., Izzy Gould, What’s in a Name? Extra Cash, Perhaps, TAMPA TRIB., Dec. 21, 2004
(Sports), at 1 (noting that Pasco County, Florida’s athletic budget for its nine high schools in
2003–2004 was approximately $1,218,627, a budget that was nearly equal to the annual value of its ten
year, $13 million deal with Pepsi to only sell Pepsi products in Pasco County schools).
12. See, e.g., Ruth Sheehan, Too Late to Cry ‘Sellout’, NEWS AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 20,
2003, at B1.
13. See Lini S. Kadaba, Museums Embrace Corporate Sponsorship, PHILA. INQ., Aug. 9, 2001
(Domestic News).
14. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN CHILDHOOD OBESITY 4–9 (2004),
available at http://www.kff.org/entmedia/upload/The-Role-of-Media-in-Childhood-Obesity.pdf.
15. See generally Edward L. Palmer & Lisa Sofio, Food and Beverage Marketing to Children in
School, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 33 (2006); Michele Simon, Food Marketing to Children and the Law: An
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from commercial sponsors. Although opponents of schoolhouse commercialism
still claim occasional victories (generally by convincing schools to avoid certain
direct marketing), they increasingly seem to be fighting a rearguard action.
Nevertheless, the commitment of the anti-commercial forces appears undimin-
ished, and battles still make headlines. In perhaps the best-known example,
Greenbrier High School in Evans, Georgia, sparked a national firestorm of
criticism when it suspended a student for wearing a Pepsi T-shirt to a Coke-
sponsored rally.16 The public outcry targeted both the heavy-handed suspension
and the commercial interests it apparently served,17 suggesting that schoolhouse
commercialism is still controversial, no matter how widespread it has become.
1. The New and Growing Market: Selling Naming Rights to School Facilities
Despite this bitter opposition, commercial activity in schools was well-
entrenched by the end of the 1990s.18 Naming rights, in fact, was one of the few
areas of commercial activity that did not experience growth. But as school
leaders sat on the sidelines, contemplating their own tight budgets and watching
millions of corporate dollars flow to other entities through naming rights
arrangements, it became almost inevitable that they would join the game.19 In
doing so, they followed—sometimes explicitly20—in the footsteps of universi-
ties,21 museums,22 and professional sports teams,23 all of which commonly
emblazon sponsors’ names on their buildings and facilities. Despite occasional
Introduction, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1 (2006); Lisa M. Spenny, Comment, Commercialism in New York
Public Schools: State Versus Local Control, 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 339 (1996).
16. See, e.g., Jingle Davis, No Coke, Pepsi: Rebel Without a Pause, ATLANTA J-CONST., Mar. 26,
1998, at 1A; Guy Friddell, Student’s Act of Cola Defiance Was Refreshing, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk,
Va.), Apr. 4, 1998, at B1; Carl Hiassen, Editorial, Be True to Your School . . . and Its Cola, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE (Charleston, W.V.), Mar. 31, 1998, at 4A.
17. See, e.g., Editorial, Pepsi T-Shirt Wasn’t a Huge Crime, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Mar. 29, 1998,
at 20A; Barry Saunders, OK, Class—Line Up, Dress Right, and Salute the Image, NEWS AND OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 28, 1998, at A19.
18. Even the National School Boards Association now invites corporate sponsors to “carve out a
special place in the minds of school board members and administrators [through] special sponsorship
opportunities.” Nat’l Sch. Bds. Ass’n, Corporate Sponsorship Opportunities with NSBA Conferences &
Meetings, http://www.nsba.org/site/page.asp?TRACKID&CID190&DID5557 (last visited June
3, 2007).
19. As one school fundraiser commented after being told that his high school was only the second in
the country to negotiate a naming rights deal, “We thought everyone did this. I thought this was a fairly
routine thing. We’re pioneers, I guess.” Chris Anderson, Naming Rights Pay for Lights, SARASOTA
HERALD-TRIB., (Sarasota, Fla.), Feb. 18, 2004, at C1.
20. Sue Kiesewetter, The Name Game; Sale of Naming Rights for Sports Facilities in Schools;
Includes Tips on Selling Naming Rights, SCH. PLANNING & MGMT., Aug. 1998, at 29; Jason Spencer,
What’s in a Name? Lots of Cash, HISD Hopes; District Ponders a Proposal to Sell Naming Rights for
Football Stadiums, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 21, 2005, at A-01.
21. See Dan Voelpel, Pay the Price and It’s (Your Name Here) Stadium; The Modern Advertising
Trend of Selling Rights to Sports Facilities Has Trickled Down to High Schools, for Better or Worse,
NEWS TRIB., (Tacoma, Wash.), May 22, 2005, at D01.
22. See Kadaba, supra note 13.
23. See, e.g., Cindy Brovsky, Stadium Naming Rights Are Usually a Package Deal, DENVER POST,
Oct. 29, 2000, at A04. For an interesting reversal of the normal practice described in this Article, see
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controversies between the entities involved,24 and some public opposition,25
these arrangements have generally been considered successful. Indeed, local
governments have increasingly tried to mimic private deals by selling advertis-
ing space on city buses and police cars,26 as well as naming rights to public
libraries,27 public stadiums, and office buildings.28 By 2000, when Brooklawn
signed its deal with ShopRite, public schools seemed to be the only places
where naming rights arrangements were not common.29
But within a few months of the Brooklawn deal,30 dozens—if not hun-
dreds—of public schools had signed naming rights deals,31 most of them
involving football stadiums and other athletic facilities.32 Schools soon ex-
panded the menu, selling off naming rights to libraries,33 hallways,34 and other
facilities. The sale of school naming rights has now become something of a
professional enterprise. In Texas, school districts have sent written solicitations
Goldie Blumenstyk, U. of Phoenix Buys Naming Rights to a Pro-Football Stadium, CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC., Oct. 6, 2006, at 30.
24. Many of these disputes center on contractual issues not addressed in any detail here. See also
John K. Eason, Private Motive and Perpetual Conditions in Charitable Naming Gifts: When Good
Names Go Bad, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 375, 402–03 (2005) (describing common conflicts in charitable
naming arrangements, and proposing state law solutions). For more information, see generally Debra E.
Blum, Donors Increasingly Use Legal Contracts to Stipulate Demands on Charities, CHRON. PHILAN-
THROPY, Mar. 21, 2002, at 9; Robert H. Thornburg, Note, Stadium Naming Rights: An Assessment of the
Contract and Trademark Issues Inherent to Both Professional and Collegiate Stadiums, 2 VA. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 328 (2003).
25. See, e.g., Cindy Brovsky, Stadium Name May Be Ignored, DENVER POST, Jan. 26, 2001 (noting
public oppostition to re-naming Mile High Stadium as Invesco Field at Mile High); Vincent P. Bzdek,
The Ad Subtractors, Making a Difference, WASH. POST, July 29, 2003, at C09 (describing activities of
Commercial Alert, a group that seeks “[t]o stop advertisers from commandeering every last nook and
cranny of American culture”).
26. Jason Bradley Kay, What Is a Good Name Worth? Local Government Sponsorships and the First
Amendment, POPULAR GOV’T, Fall 2003, at 30, 30, 35.
27. Name Games Question, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 9, 2005, at 8B (reporting mixed public
response to a plan to sell naming rights to city library).
28. Kay, supra note 26, at 30.
29. Molnar’s 1998 report cited “Appropriation of Space” as a small and shrinking category of
commercial activity in schools. MOLNAR, SPONSORED SCHOOLS, supra note 8, at 28.
30. See Lewin, supra note 1; Strauss, supra note 1. Brooklawn’s deal is generally recognized as the
first of its kind. John Kellmayer, Is It Wrong To Sell Naming Rights? No; It Brings Money to Schools,
AM. TEACHER, Mar. 2002, http://www.aft.org/pubs-reports/american_teacher/mar02/speakout.html (last
visited Apr. 2, 2007); Bill Pennington, Reading, Writing, and Corporate Sponsorships, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
18, 2004, (Sports), at 1.
31. ALEX MOLNAR, EDUC. POL’Y STUDIES LAB., WHAT’S IN A NAME? THE CORPORATE BRANDING OF
AMERICA’S SCHOOLS: THE FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT ON TRENDS IN SCHOOLHOUSE COMMERCIALISM 7 (2002)
[hereinafter MOLNAR, WHAT’S IN A NAME?] (reporting dramatic increase in news citations of naming
rights sales following Brooklawn deal).
32. Lewin, supra note 1.
33. See Geoff Mulvihill, N.J. School Sells Naming Rights to Raise Money, MKTG. NEWS, May 15,
2004, at 7.
34. Roundtable: Voting Rights, Treason, School Names (NPR radio broadcast June 27, 2006)
(reporting sales in a Wisconsin school district).
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to local and national businesses offering naming rights to school stadiums.35
Many public schools have begun to imitate universities36 by openly soliciting
naming rights deals and announcing asking prices for various school facilities:
$1 million for a building, $25,000 for a classroom, and so on.37 In just a few
short years, the sale of public school naming rights had developed from fodder
for humor columnists38 into a multi-million dollar industry that involves schools,
students, and sponsors nationwide. Even years after the practice had become
commonplace, many people continued to regard naming rights deals with
considerable suspicion. In California, when school boards responded to 2003
state budget cuts by openly considering naming rights arrangements, local
newspapers called the move “unprecedented” and “radical.”39 Three years
earlier, they would have been right.
2. Funding, Charity, and Commerce: Motivations Behind the Sale and Purchase
of School Naming Rights
Two inexorable forces have driven the spread of naming rights arrangements:
schools’ need for funding, and companies’ desire for advertising.40 Given these
mixed motivations, it is difficult to classify public school naming rights deals as
commercial transactions, charitable donations, or even some kind of educational
or political speech.
For school administrators, at least, the motivation for selling naming rights is
relatively straightforward: money.41 Naming rights are a relatively plentiful and
valuable asset that every school possesses. And unlike corporate-sponsored
educational materials, naming rights do not necessarily require schools to
35. See Anita Powell, For Sale: Round Rock ISD Looks To Sell Stadium Name, AUSTIN AM.–
STATESMAN (Austin, Tex.), Oct. 30, 2003, at A1; Spencer, supra note 20.
36. Universities often have elaborate and specific naming rights policies which address the criteria
for naming school facilities, including the amounts which must be donated and the methods by which
donors will be selected. See, e.g, N.C. STATE UNIV. BD. OF TRS., POLICIES, REGULATIONS, AND RULES,
Policy 03.00.2 (1994) (amended 2005), available at http://www.ncsu.edu/policies/alumni_dev/pdf/
POL03.00.2.doc; UNIV. OF N.M. POL’Y OFFICE, UNIV. OF N.M. BD. OF REGENTS POLICY MANUAL § 2.11
(1995) (amended 2001 & 2005), available at http://www.unm.edu/brpm/r211.htm.
37. See Lewin, supra note 1; see also Lisa Marie Pane, School Raises Funds by Selling Name
Rights, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah), Aug. 10, 2001, at A10 (listing prices for school facilities
in Newport, Rhode Island); Leif Strickland, Extra Credit for School Donors; For the Right Amount, HP
Will Make You a Big Name on Campus, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 27, 2002, at 1A (listing asking
prices for school facilities in Texas’ Highland Park school district).
38. Elizabeth Chang, A School by Any Other Name Would Be . . . Richer, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1999,
at B05; Editorial, So What’s Next, Nike Elementary?, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Mar. 29, 1998, at
16B.
39. Jeff Donaldson, Some Schools Mull Sale of Naming Rights To Raise Funds, DESERT SUN (Palm
Springs, Cal.), Feb. 4, 2003, at 1B.
40. Judy Keen, Wis. Schools Find Corporate Sponsors; Cafeterias, Gyms, More Renamed To Nab
Easy Cash, USA TODAY, July 28, 2006, at 3A.
41. MOLNAR, SPONSORED SCHOOLS, supra note 8, at 10 (“The justification for the sponsorship
agreements most often used by educators is the need for money.”); see also Gould, supra note 11.
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change their daily routines or curricula.42 Faced with the prospect of this “free
money,” school administrators may find it impossible—and unnecessary—to
resist. Paul Vallas, chief executive of the Philadelphia public schools, is un-
abashed in his support for naming rights deals: “My approach is Leave No
Dollar Behind . . . . There are tremendous needs in this system . . . , where
eighty-five percent of the kids are below poverty level. I’m not uncomfortable
with corporations giving us money and getting their names on things. As long as
it’s not inappropriate, I don’t see any downside.”43
Although school administrators’ reasoning may be straightforward, purchas-
ers’ motivations are somewhat more nuanced, involving a complex mixture of
private and public interest.44 Nearly all naming rights purchasers are companies
and other for-profit entities,45 and many insist that their purchases are motivated
by a desire to “be part of the community. . . . If we get some recognition from it,
more power to it.”46
But it seems implausible that corporate purchasers of naming rights are
motivated purely by altruism.47 Corporate directors, after all, have fiduciary
duties to improve the company’s bottom line, not to pursue philanthropy.48
Scholars, courts, and executives themselves have all described corporate chari-
42. See infra text accompanying note 147 for discussion of whether a school’s name can be
considered part of its “curriculum.”
43. Lewin, supra note 1; see also Joseph Di Bona et al., Commercialism in North Carolina High
Schools: A Survey of Principals’ Perceptions, 78 PEABODY J. EDUC. 41, 56 (2003) (reporting high school
principals’ positive impressions of corporate sponsored events).
44. See UNIV. OF OR. EDUC. RES. INFO. CTR., Business Partnerships with Schools, POL’Y REP., Fall
2001, at 1 (quoting a Verizon manager as saying that the company’s “commitment to education is
driven by its responsibility as a good corporate citizen and by the understanding that today’s students
will be tomorrow’s employees, consumers, regulators, and neighbors”). For an interesting attempt to
classify corporate involvement with school reform according to the motivations of the corporations
involved, see Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, International Business Machinations: A Case Study of Corpo-
rate Involvement in Local Education Reform, 100 TCHRS. C. REC. 476, 491–96 (1999), available at
http://www.uncc.edu/rmicklsn/images/corporate.pdf.
45. Research for this Article revealed only two examples of public high school facilities named after
individual, non-corporate financial donors. Alan Schmadtke, Stadium Naming Is Big Business: Corpo-
rate Money Is Dictating the Names of College and Even High School Facilities, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
May 25, 2006, at D1.
46. Christine MacDonald, Got Cash? Buy School Name; To Ease Tight Budgets, Plymouth-Canton,
Others Ponder Sale of Naming Rights to Buildings, Events, DETROIT NEWS, June 27, 2005, at 1A
(quoting president of a company that had donated $25,000 for a playground).
47. See Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous Promises,
1997 WIS. L. REV 567, 572–85 (arguing that altruism “is an insufficient explanation for gift-giving
behavior” generally, and exploring other rationales such as trust and status enhancement).
48. In the seminal corporate philanthropy case, the Delaware Court of Chancery “conclude[d] that
the test to be applied in passing on the validity of a gift such as the one here in issue is that of
reasonableness, a test in which the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code pertaining to charitable
gifts by corporations furnish a helpful guide.” Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398,
405 (Del. Ch. 1969). Even so, nearly all states have passed statutes allowing corporations to make
charitable donations even without demonstrating their value to the company. See Jill E. Fisch, Teaching
Corporate Governance Through Shareholder Litigation, 34 GA. L. REV. 745, 765 (2000).
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table contributions as creating financial benefits for the contributor.49 As one
petitioner recently argued to the United States Supreme Court in a First Amend-
ment case: “[A]ll corporate speech is, and should be, uttered in the interest of
benefiting the corporation in the eyes of potential consumers.”50 The fact that
sponsors ask for naming rights, as opposed to simply making anonymous or
restriction-free donations,51 suggests that the naming rights themselves are
intended to serve, at least in part, as advertising, just like naming rights to
professional sports stadiums. There is nothing pernicious about companies
pursuing profit in this way.52 But because advertising and other forms of
“commercial” speech are entitled to a different level of protection than other
kinds of speech, a sponsor’s profit-seeking motive may be relevant for First
Amendment purposes.
Moreover, many corporate sponsors proudly embrace the naming rights-as-
advertising theory. After paying $504,000 to rename a Tacoma high school
football stadium after his Chevrolet dealership, Jerry Yoder made the point quite
clearly: “If people went to that stadium . . . , and it said Riverside Ford Stadium,
where do you think people would go to buy their cars? What if it said Korum
Ford?”53 Yoder’s business partner at Sunset Chevrolet added, “It’s hard to
measure . . . , but we think we’re getting more than our money’s worth.”54 Even
opponents of naming rights arrangements agree with that assessment of naming
rights’ effectiveness.55 Although the opportunity to expose those children to a
corporate brand throughout every school day may not immediately result in an
upswing of sales for a particular product, corporate donors know that such
exposure can over time generate feelings of familiarity, goodwill, and even
loyalty toward the company and its products.
School administrators might not care why a particular sponsor chooses to
purchase naming rights, so long as its check clears. But although a corporate
sponsor’s commercial motives may not affect the value of its dollars, they do
49. Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora’s Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate
Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579, 662 & n.362 (1997).
50. Brief for Arthur W. Page Society et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 19, Nike v.
Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 835090.
51. See MOLNAR, WHAT’S IN A NAME?, supra note 31, at 2.
52. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J.
439, 441 (2001) (“All thoughtful people believe that corporate enterprise should be organized and
operated to serve the interests of society as a whole, and that the interests of shareholders deserve no
greater weight in this social calculus than do the interests of any other members of society. The point is
simply that now, as a consequence of both logic and experience, there is convergence on a consensus
that the best means to this end (that is, the pursuit of aggregate social welfare) is to make corporate
managers strongly accountable to shareholder interests and, at least in direct terms, only to those
interests.”).
53. Voelpel, supra note 21.
54. Id.; see also Keen, supra note 40; MOLNAR, WHAT’S IN A NAME?, supra note 31, at 16.
55. See Lewin, supra note 1; see also Tamara R. Piety, Free Advertising: The Case for Public
Relations as Commercial Speech, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 367, 374 (2006) (“When a newspaper
carries a company’s ‘message’ it is better than any advertising because it is both free and more credible
to the public than it would be coming directly from the company.”).
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shape the First Amendment protections to which it is entitled, as section III.B
describes. They also add fuel to the criticism that naming rights deals are simply
another form of schoolhouse commercialism that distracts from schools’ pri-
mary educational missions. The following section describes this and other
criticisms advanced against school naming rights.
3. Concerns Raised by the Sale of Naming Rights
The spread of naming rights arrangements, like the schoolhouse commercial-
ism that helped spawn them, has inspired skepticism and even strong opposi-
tion. Perhaps the most immediately apparent concern is the possibility of a “bad
name” sponsor putting its name on the side of a public school.56 Would-be
sponsors whose products (such as alcohol or cigarettes) are considered inappro-
priate for children are clear candidates for this categorization, and many school
administrators have already stated that they will not seek or accept deals with
such sponsors.57 And although it may seem unlikely that a truly villainous
character would maliciously bid on the right to name a public school, nightmare
scenarios might be more likely than school boards suspect.58 To take just one
example from an analogous area of government sponsorship, the Ku Klux Klan
recently attempted to become an acknowledged sponsor of a Missouri public
radio station59 and a stretch of Missouri road as part of the Adopt-A-Highway
program.60 Both times the Klan was predictably rejected by the responsible
state agency, and both times it mounted a constitutional challenge. And although
the Klan lost its claim against the public radio station, it won the right to be
included in Missouri’s Adopt-A-Highway program,61 much to the horror of the
program’s directors.
Nor are state agencies the only parties who have been burned by bad
sponsorship deals. Horror stories from the world of private sponsorship suggest
that concerns about “bad name” sponsors are quite real. Even a seemingly
56. See Kay, supra note 26, at 30 (internal citation omitted). See generally Eason, supra note 24.
57. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 1.
58. See Eason, supra note 24, at 387–88, 394–402 (discussing specific examples of “charitably
inclined malfeasants whose names now adorn various charitable institutions or facilities across the
nation”); John Kass, If This Group Is Involved, It’s a Really Bad Sign, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 14, 2005, at C2
(reporting National Man-Boy Love Association’s adoption of a highway in Illinois); Editorial, County
Should Have Rejected Nazis, OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.), Feb. 4, 2005, at B10 (reporting that county,
fearing lawsuits, allowed American Nazi Party to adopt a stretch of highway).
59. See Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1809, 1094
(8th Cir. 2000).
60. Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702, 705 (8th Cir. 2000).
61. Cuffley was decided on Equal Protection grounds, but the court specifically noted that “[w]hether
this claim arises under the Equal Protection Clause or the First Amendment, it is clear that the State
may not deny access to the Adopt-A-Highway program based on the applicant’s views.” Id. at 706 n.3.
But see Texas v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 58 F.3d 1075, 1079–81 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that
state’s reason for denying the Klan’s application to adopt a portion of highway outside a public housing
project was reasonable and viewpoint neutral, since the state sought to prevent the Klan from
intimidating residents and frustrating a federal desegregation order).
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harmless naming rights arrangement can go sour when a sponsor’s business or
personal conduct is later called into question. Baseball fans remember that in
1999, the Houston Astros’ new major league ballpark was christened Enron
Field, after the energy giant paid $100 million for 30 years of naming rights.
Two years later, Enron CEO Ken Lay was a disgraced and widely reviled figure,
the company itself was in the middle of a catastrophic bankruptcy that cost
thousands of Astros-loving Houstonians their jobs, and the Astros were scram-
bling to buy out the remainder of the naming rights contract for $2.1 million.62
Lay and Enron are by no means the only high-profile donors whose naming
rights deals have caused financial and image problems for donees.63
Of course, the “bad name” scenario is not the only objection to naming rights,
and may not even be the most serious. Echoing decades-old arguments against
schoolhouse commercialism, opponents of school naming rights deals argue
that emblazoning corporate names on public school facilities demeans the
schools,64 “cheapens the honor bestowed on long-time public servants and civic
leaders when a facility is named for them,”65 and interferes with schools’
primary mission of educating students.66 These critics bolster their arguments
with evidence suggesting that younger children are cognitively incapable of
recognizing advertising for what it is,67 and are thus particularly susceptible to
seeing a company’s name on their school as an endorsement of the company
and a part of their educational experience.68 The Children’s Museum of Cleve-
land received a dramatic illustration of this point after selling its naming rights
to a local hospital. As the museum’s executive director reported, “We had little
children getting off school buses and hanging onto the post outside afraid to
62. The rights were later re-sold to Minute Maid, a subsidiary of Coca-Cola, which reportedly paid
$170 million for twenty-eight years of naming rights. See Clay Robinson, Please, Let’s Not End Up
with Any ‘McParks’ in Texas, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 6, 2006, (Outlook), at 3; see also Lay’s Alma Mater
Struggles with Donation: Seeks ‘Alternative Use’ for Stock Profits Instead of Economics Chair Position,
MSNBC.COM, May 26, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12992280.
63. See, e.g., Shannon Allen, Jubilee Hall, SETON HALL MAG., Nov. 1, 2005, available at http://
www.shu.edu/news/magazine/2005-fall-static/2005_fall_hallmark5.html (reporting that “Seton Hall has
removed the name of L. Dennis Kozlowski from” one of its buildings); Jeffrey N. Gangemi, Heard on
Campus: Tyco Conviction Leads to Renaming, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Sept. 25, 2005, http://www.business-
week.com/bschools/content/sep2005/bs20050925_7716.htm (reporting same); John R. Wilke et al.,
Scrushy May Be Indicted Today, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2003, at A3 (noting Richard M. Scrushy’s
“alleged role in a massive accounting fraud at the company he founded” and also noting that his “name
adorns roads, buildings, schools and athletic fields” throughout Alabama).
64. Strickland, supra note 37 (quoting a school board member as saying that selling naming rights
would “cheapen” the school district).
65. Larry King, The World-Herald’s Priority Is What Best Serves the Readers, OMAHA WORLD
HERALD (Omaha, Neb.), Aug. 10, 2003, at 11b (explaining newspaper’s decision to call a convention
center by its popular name despite a recent sale of naming rights); see also Mark Zaloudek, Should
Donors Get To Name Public Schools?, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB. (Sarasota, Fla.), Mar. 21, 2005, at E1.
66. CITIZENS’ CAMPAIGN FOR COMMERCIAL-FREE SCHOOLS, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COMMERCIALIZING THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS?, available at http://www.scn.org/cccs/arguments.html (last visited July 21, 2006); see
also Eason, supra note 24, at 399.
67. Kadaba, supra note 13.
68. See Spencer, supra note 20.
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come in because they thought they had to get shots . . . .”69
Even putting aside this set of advertising-related concerns, naming rights
deals might raise unexpected but difficult issues related to the problem they are
supposed to solve: funding. Naming rights arrangements can potentially threaten
inter-school equality, since schools with a more “marketable” student body—
most likely schools situated in affluent areas—are likely to draw the most
attention from would-be corporate donors.70 Though public schools are not
obligated by the U.S. Constitution to maintain districtwide equality,71 school
administrators may nonetheless be concerned that naming rights sales will
exaggerate pre-existing resource disparities. On the other hand, some see the
sale of naming rights as a means to correct disparities between schools.72
Schools facing tight budget restrictions—for example, schools in areas without
a strong tax base—may see naming rights deals as a creative way to raise
additional funds.
Even if naming rights deals do not increase these funding gaps, some critics
allege that they will, in the long run, hurt school funding across the board.
Those critics argue that the sale of naming rights privatizes civic responsibil-
ity73 and makes taxpayers less likely to vote for school funding measures in the
future.74 And as the stories of Enron, Tyco, and several dot-coms75 show,
private sponsors may not be as financially dependable as they seem.76
The concerns described in this Part are for the most part matters of policy,
and the Constitution does not require school boards to address them in any one
particular way. Some school boards will strictly limit the sponsors they will
accept and the deals they enter into. Others will deny all corporate sponsorship
of school activities and facilities.77 Most will probably chart a middle course,
limiting naming rights but not banning them, and allowing some sponsors while
69. Kadaba, supra note 13.
70. See Randy Krebs, Our View: Schools Should Think Before Entering Deal for Naming Rights, ST.
CLOUD TIMES (St. Cloud, Minn.), July 19, 2005, at 5B (noting that interest in naming rights was focused
on one of city’s larger, more affluent schools, and asking whether such deals “could . . . foster
segregation by economics”).
71. See San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54–55 (1973) (rejecting Equal Protection challenge to
system of school finance based on local property taxes).
72. See Kiesewetter, supra note 20 (citing a public school official as saying, “All too often private
donations go to private schools—the Notre Dames and Harvards. Those donations only affect a small
number of people and have very little impact on the local community.”).
73. MacDonald, supra note 46 (quoting education advocacy association director opposed to commer-
cialism as saying “it then says to taxpayers they no longer have responsibility for the public schools”).
74. UNIV. OF OR. EDUC. RES. INFO. CTR., supra note 44, at 10.
75. Thornburg, supra note 24, at 333.
76. MOLNAR, SPONSORED SCHOOLS, supra note 8, at 8.
77. In June 1999, in direct response to concerns about commercialism in schools, San Francisco
passed the “Commercial-Free Schools Act” to set limits on in-school advertising. San Francisco Passes
the Commercial-Free Schools Act, NOT FOR SALE (Ctr. for Commercial-Free Pub. Educ., Oakland, Ca.),
Spring 2000, at 1, available at http://www.ibiblio.org/commercialfree/newsletters/nl300.pdf.
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rejecting others.78 But because naming rights deals are so valuable, not all of
these would-be sponsors will take a rejection lying down. Some are likely to
mount First Amendment challenges to their exclusion. These challenges will
shift the focus back to schools to show a legitimate reason for rejecting the
sponsor. Perhaps the best way to do this is by reference to a pre-existing written
policy. The following Part sketches the contours of the most common policy
approaches to naming rights, concluding that school boards have not yet
addressed—nor even truly acknowledged—the First Amendment implications
of naming rights.
II. POLICY AND PRACTICE
Written naming rights policies provide schools with ready-made—and, if the
policies are well-written, viewpoint-neutral—reasons to exclude undesirable
sponsors. Although this may not be a perfect antidote to all First Amendment
challenges,79 it does insulate school boards against charges of viewpoint discrimi-
nation, which are probably the strongest First Amendment charges they will
face. Conversely, a total lack of policy, or a failure to follow a policy once it is
in place, may inadvertently create a “public forum” in which schools’ power to
limit sponsors is extremely limited.80
Despite these potential benefits, few school boards have policies governing
the sale of naming rights. Most facility-naming policies reflect the “traditional”
method of naming schools after community leaders or geographic features. Very
few address the selection of paying sponsors, or do so only in cursory fashion.81
In short, the spread of naming rights arrangements has not found an accurate—
nor even approximate—reflection in school board policies. This massive and
growing gap is troubling both as a matter of policy and as a matter of
constitutional law.
For constitutional purposes, the most disturbing aspect of the practice-policy
gap is that it apparently reflects the belief that a school board can sell naming
rights without reference to any written policy at all.82 If nothing else, it is clear
78. See, e.g., CITIZENS’ CAMPAIGN FOR COMMERCIAL-FREE SCHOOLS, CORPORATIONS LOSE BATTLE FOR
SEATTLE SCHOOLS (Nov. 21, 2001), available at http://epsl.asu.edu/ceru/Articles/CERU-0111-60-
OWI.doc (last visited June 10, 2007).
79. See Mary Jean Dolan, The Special Public Purpose Forum and Endorsement Relationships: New
Extensions of Government Speech, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71, 79–100 (2004) (discussing the
constitutionality of various content limitations, including those—such as “no public controversy”
policies and religion-based policies—which fare poorly against First Amendment challenges).
80. See also infra notes 257–59 and accompanying text.
81. Though no complete survey of naming rights policies is yet available, only 44.3% of 174 public
school principals in a recent North Carolina survey reported having a policy in place for dealing with
commercialism in schools. Di Bona et al., supra note 43, at 49.
82. Don Hunter, Assembly Alters Naming Policy; Public Places: Emphasis on the Deceased When It
Comes to City Parks, Facilities, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, June 21, 2006, at B1 (reporting that the
Anchorage Assembly recently considered and then specifically eliminated guidelines which would have
given guidance to the sale of naming rights to corporate or private investors, despite recognizing that
the practice does occur).
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that schools acting outside of an established policy framework expose them-
selves to First Amendment challenges. By this measure, many schools have
already dropped their best constitutional defenses. Moreover, simply creating
policies to fill the practice-policy gap is not enough. In order to shield a school
board from First Amendment challenges, a policy must also be followed once it
is put into place.83
To date, the closest that many school boards have come to an actual naming
rights policy is a public promise to avoid “bad” sponsors. Struggling to identify
the lines he would and would not cross in choosing sponsors, Brooklawn
School Board President Bruce Darrow said, “Look, no one is suggesting us
contracting with Delilah’s Den[, a local gentleman’s club]. . . . We wouldn’t
consider a product tie-in. . . . But everyone uses food, so we contracted with a
supermarket, a local supermarket. We’re talking to local banks, people like
that.”84 Following Darrow’s shaky example, few school boards have been able
to articulate clear standards by which to select sponsors.85 One school adminis-
trator attempted to explain his preference for Comcast as a sponsor by saying,
“Comcast is public in nature. What they do is related to what we do. And a lot
of our events are televised out of that building. There’s a good synergy with
us.”86 Without written policies to guide them, school administrators are limited
to such vague statements of preference.
Part of the problem may be a simple policy lag, as school boards struggle to
update their written rules to reflect current practice. Indeed, until the sale of
naming rights became prevalent in recent years, schools were generally named
after geographic or other area-specific features,87 or historical figures such as
U.S. Presidents. Prior to 2000, nearly all school board policies were based on
this model, which left no room for sponsorships or other commercial naming
rights deals. The only significant deviations were those policies which called for
83. See Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 1229–32 (7th Cir. 1985);
E. Timor Action Network v. New York, 71 F. Supp. 2d 334, 338–40 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Nat’l Abortion
Fed’n v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 112 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2000). Some courts
have found that the lack of practical oversight over a particular policy was sufficient to create a limited
public forum for free speech. See, e.g., Christ’s Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Southeastern Pa. Transit Auth.,
148 F.3d 242, 251 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Frayda S. Bluestein, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to
the Forum: Free Speech Issues with Government Websites 5 (Sept. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author) (citing cases); Dolan, supra note 79, at 81 (“[W]here a municipality imposes no
selective system of controls and has a history of allowing a broad range of speech in its advertising
forums, courts will find a designated forum and apply strict scrutiny to invalidate all rejections of
proposed speech.”) (internal citations omitted).
84. Strauss, supra note 1.
85. But see Zaloudek, supra note 65 (reporting that Philadelphia schools refuse naming rights deals
with alcohol or tobacco companies).
86. Schmadtke, supra note 45.
87. See, e.g., DURHAM (N.C.) PUB. SCH., DPS DISTRICT POLICIES, Policy No. 6090 (1993) (revised
1999), available at http://www.dpsnc.net/index.php?optioncom_kb&Itemid1&pagearticles&
articleid205 (“New schools built in the Durham Public Schools normally will be named after
townships, regions, or community characteristics.”).
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community nomination or the creation of a naming committee.88 But this
democratic variant was almost certainly not intended to enable corporate nam-
ing deals, since it is unlikely that schools hoping to sell naming rights would try
to do so through a process requiring community nomination of sponsors. Such a
process—nomination of potential buyers, followed by negotiations between the
nominees and the school—would be unwieldy at best.
Nevertheless, modern naming rights arrangements can directly trace their
lineage to certain elements of the traditional policies and their democratic
cousins. Specifically, some traditional-style policies allow facilities to be named
after specific (even living) individuals who have made some significant “contri-
bution” to the school or community.89 Although these policies usually refer only
to “persons” or “individuals” and are silent with regard to companies and other
entities,90 they implicitly acknowledge that the names of schools and school
facilities could be used to reward contributors to the school. By doing so, they
set the stage for the evolution of a more modern policy approach.
Many modern policies, clearly drawing on the “contribution” variant of the
traditional model, specifically acknowledge that a financial donation to the
88. See, e.g., BELLINGHAM (WASH.) SCH. DIST. 501 BD. OF SCH. DIRS., SCHOOL BOARD POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES, Policy No. 9250 (1995), available at http://www.bham.wednet.edu/policies/9250Policy.
htm; ROCHESTER (N.Y.) CITY SCH. DIST. BD. OF EDUC., POLICY MANUAL, Policy No. 7500-R (1998),
available at http://www.rcsdk12.org/BOE/PM/PM%20pdfs/7000/7500%20Naming%20Facilities.pdf;
BUNCOMBE COUNTY (N.C.) BD. OF EDUC., DISTRICT POLICIES, Policy No. 535 (1992), available at http://
www.buncombe.k12.nc.us/9651052316140357/lib/9651052316140357/Policies/
Business%20Non%20Instructional%20500/535.pdf; ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY (MD.) PUBLIC SCHOOLS BD. OF
EDUC., BOARD POLICIES AND ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS, Policy No. 706 (1965) (revised 1989), available at
http://www.aacps.org/aacps/boe/board/newpolicy/Sections/section_700/adminreg706.pdf (providing for a nam-
ing committee); BROCKPORT (KY.) CENT. SCH. DIST. BD. OF EDUC., BOARD POLICIES, Policy No. 5850, NAMING
SCHOOL FACILITIES (1990) (revised 1990, 1994, 2000, 2004), available at http://brockport.k12.ny.us/
policies.cfm?pid151.
89. See, e.g., SHENANDOAH COUNTY (VA.) PUB. SCH. SCH. BD., POLICY MANUAL, § F: NAMING SCHOOL
FACILITIES (1997), available at http://www.shenandoah.k12.va.us/pdf/policymanual/Sec%20F%2005-
06.pdf; HERMISTON (OR.) SCH. DIST. 8, ONLINE POLICY MANUAL: NAMING SCHOOL FACILITIES (1994)
(revised 2005), available at http://policy.osba.org/hermiston/F/FF%20D1.pdf; EL PASO INDEP. SCH.
DIST. BD. OF TRS., ALERT POLICIES: NAMING SCHOOLS, OTHER FACILITIES, AND FUNCTION AREAS (2006),
available at http://www.episd.org/Board/docs/policyalerts/alertpolicies/05-2006_alertpolicies/CWLocal-
.pdf; OXNARD (CAL.) UNION HIGH SCH. DIST. SCH. BD., BOARD POLICIES, Policy No. 7310 (1993) (revised
1993, 1994, 2004), available at http://www.ouhsd.k12.ca.us/FLS/Policies/7000/b-p7310.pdf; TORRANCE
(CAL.) UNIFIED SCH. DIST. BD. OF EDUC., BOARD POLICIES, Policy No. 7310 (2001), available at
http://www.tusd.org/pages/supt/BdPolicy/7000.pdf; JONESBORO (ARK.) PUB. SCH. DIST., JPS APPROVED
POLICIES, Job Code FF: NAMING OF SCHOOL FACILITIES (2002), available at http://170.211.100.4/policy/
FF.html.
90. CARTERET COUNTY (N.C.) PUB. SCH. SYS. BD. OF EDUC., POLICY MANUAL, Policy FF (revised
2006), available at http://www.carteretcountyschools.org/hr/PolicyManual/facilitiesdev/FF.doc; SAINT
LOUIS (MO.) BD. OF EDUC., BOARD POLICIES AND ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS, Policy No. 7600 (2001),
available at http://www.slps.org/Board_Education/policies/7600.htm. But see MONONA GROVE (WIS.)
SCH. DIST. BD. OF EDUC., BOARD POLICIES, Policy No. 940 (2003), available at http://www.mgsd.k12.wi.us/
locations/districtoffice/school_board/Policies/900/940.pdf (allowing new facilities “to be named after
an individual or entity if the individual or entity is considered a major contributor to the Monona Grove
School District”).
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school system could satisfy the “contribution” requirement91 and override
otherwise applicable naming rules.92 In effect, these policies simply broaden the
meaning of “contribution.” In addition to redefining contribution, some also
incorporate the democratic elements of the traditional model, such as nomina-
tions and other community input.93 In smaller ways, too, policy changes have
paved the way for naming rights sales. For example, many modern policies
differentiate between school facilities and the “areas within” them,94 often
allowing the sale of naming rights to the latter, but not the former.95 On the
other hand, a small subset of policies apparently recognize the prevalence of the
modern approach and take the opposite tack, creating a blanket ban on the
naming of school facilities after donors or commercial enterprises.96 Finally,
some policies essentially open the door for named sponsors while reserving a
specific process for rescinding that name under circumstances such as the
sponsor’s conviction for a felony or crime involving moral turpitude.97 Al-
91. VOLUSIA COUNTY (FLA.) SCH. DIST. SCH. BD., SCHOOL BOARD POLICIES, Policy No. 610 (2004),
available at http://www.volusia.k12.fl.us/legalservices/610.pdf; HAW. BD. OF EDUC., BOE POLICIES,
Policy No. 6750 (1971) (amended 1979, 2005), available at http://lilinote.k12.hi.us/STATE/BOE/
POL1.NSF/85255a0a0010ae82852555340060479d/df3ede666ef58dd30a2566a3008371be?OpenDocument
(“School facilities may be named to honor major benefactors whose significant contributions benefit the school,
school-community, or public education.”)
92. PERRYSBURG (OHIO), BYLAWS & POLICIES, Policy No. 7110, available at http://www.neola.com/
perrysburg-oh/search/policies/po7110.htm; COLUMBIA (MO.) SCH. DIST. NO. 93 BD. OF EDUC., POLICIES
AND REGULATIONS, Policy FF (1997) (revised 2006), available at http://www.columbia.k12.mo.us/policies/
FF-S.pdf.
93. See, e.g., COBB COUNTY (GA.) SCH. DIST. BD. OF EDUC., COBB COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT ADMINISTRA-
TIVE RULES, Administrative Rule FF (1969) (revised 1983, 1984, 1988, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2004, 2005),
available at http://www.cobbk12.org/centraloffice/adminrules/F_Rules/Rule%20FF.htm; FAIRFAX COUNTY
(VA.) PUB. SCH. SCH. BD., POLICIES, NOTICES, AND REGULATIONS, Policy No. 8170.1 (1987) (revised
2004), available at http://www.fcps.edu/Directives/P8170.pdf; FALLS CHURCH CITY (VA.) PUB. SCH. SCH.
BD., BOARD POLICIES, Policy No. 4.25 (2006), available at http://www.fccps.k12.va.us/html/facilitiespoli-
cies/4.25r.pdf.
94. See, e.g., COBB COUNTY (GA.) SCH. DIST., supra note 93.
95. See, e.g., SCH. DIST. OF PHILA. BD. OF EDUC., SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA POLICIES, Policy
No. 712 (1987) (revised 1994), available at http://www.phila.k12.pa.us/offices/administration/policies/
712.html; SCH. DIST. OF WAUKESHA (WIS.) SCH. BD., DISTRICT POLICIES, Policy No. 9600G (1990) (2000),
available at http://www.waukesha.k12.wi.us/Library/lcumming/9600g.pdf. But see BROCKTON (MASS.)
PUB. SCH., SCHOOL COMMITTEE POLICY MANUAL, Policy FF (2003), available at http://www.brocktonpub-
licschools.com/administration/policy_manual/ff.html (“It is the policy of the Brockton School Commit-
tee not to name a part or area of a building facility, grounds, or parts thereof, once the building, facility,
grounds or parts thereof has been named for another individual person.”).
96. LOUDOUN COUNTY (VA.) PUB. SCH. SCH. BD., SCHOOL BOARD BYLAWS, Bylaw § 2-33 (2004),
available at http://www.loudoun.k12.va.us/50975518115039/lib/50975518115039/Chapter%202/2-
33.pdf; VENTURA (CAL.) UNIFIED SCH. DIST. BD. OF EDUC., BOARD POLICY, Policy No. 7511 (1992),
available at http://www.ventura.k12.ca.us/legalcounsel/id927.htm.
97. The author’s search found only one policy that allowed for rescinding a name, and even then the
policy applied only in “extraordinary circumstances” including a situation where the sponsor has been
convicted of “a felony, a crime involving moral turpitude, or [has] participated in any other disreputable
behavior which would have a negative reflection or would bring discredit upon district students or
staff.” CLARK COUNTY (NEV.) SCH. DIST. BD. OF TRS., POLICIES & REGULATIONS, Policy No. 7223 (2004),
available at http://ccsd.net/directory/pol-reg/pdf/7223P.pdf.; see also TENN. BD. OF REGENTS, POLICIES
AND REGULATIONS, Policy No. 4:02:05:01 (1992), available at http://www.tbr.state.tn.us/policies_guide-
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though subtle, these policy changes effectively allow—or, more accurately,
acknowledge—a sea change in the way schools are named.
But even though some recently amended policies recognize and allow the
sale of naming rights, the vast majority do not. The gap between practice and
policy, it seems, remains wide. Many school boards have apparently interpreted
a lack of policy as an implicit authorization, and have engaged in naming rights
deals so long as their own policies do not specifically prohibit them.98 Perhaps
the most common situation, however, involves districts whose policies allow
schools and school facilities to be named after those who have made a “contribu-
tion” to the school or community. Some school boards might argue that, even
independent of such a revision, the contribution model is broad enough to
encompass financial donors. Few “contribution” policies support such a reading,
however, as most of them were clearly drawn up to honor long-serving school
employees or public servants. In fact, most “contribution” policies refer only to
“individuals”99 and often specifically exclude living or non-retired persons.100
Nearly all contemplate recognition of contributions to the “public welfare,”101
rather than the public fisc. Paid naming rights arrangements fit awkwardly, if at
all, into this model.
The First Amendment looms large in this gap between naming rights policy
and practice. The policy review in this Part suggests that local school boards,
like other government actors before them,102 may be wandering inadvertently
into a First Amendment thicket. The following Part illuminates potential paths
through it.
III. A FIRST AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK FOR SCHOOL NAMING RIGHTS
Although school board officials generally see naming rights as a policy issue
lines/business_policies/4-02-05-01.htm (“[N]o building may bear the name of an individual convicted
of a felony.”).
98. See, e.g., Dave Aeikens, St. Cloud District Debates Playground Sponsorship, Names, ST. CLOUD
TIMES (St. Cloud, Minn.), July 9, 2005, at 1A (quoting school board chairman as saying, “I’m not
against the policy. What I’m against is losing the money because we don’t have time to do the policy. If
we can get this done and not lose the money, if it triggers adopting a policy, great, but let’s not lose the
money.”).
99. PITT COUNTY (N.C.) SCH. BD. OF EDUC., BOARD POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, Policy No. 5.401(re-
vised 1993) (reviewed 2005), available at http://www.pitt.k12.nc.us/boe/files/5/5.401_Naming_Schools_
and_Ancillary_Facilities.doc; FAIRFAX COUNTY (VA.) PUB. SCH. SCH. BD., POLICIES, NOTICES, AND
DIRECTIVES, Regulation No. 8170.3 (2004), available at http://www.fcps.edu/Directives/R8170.pdf.
100. See JEFFCO (COLO.) PUB. SCH. BD. OF EDUC., DISTRICT POLICY, Policy FF (1997) (revised 2005),
available at http://jeffcoweb.jeffco.k12.co.us/board/policies/ff.html (requiring “outstanding service,”
rather than a particular “contribution,” for an individual’s name to be considered).
101. See MILWAUKEE (WIS.) PUB. SCH. BD. OF GOVERNANCE, ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES OF THE MILWAU-
KEE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Policy No. 5.01(1986) (revised 1995, 2000, 2003, 2006), available at http://
www2.milwaukee.k12.wi.us/governance/rulespol/policies/PDF/CH05/5_01.pdf.
102. See Irene Segal Ayers, What Rudy Hasn’t Taken Credit For: First Amendment Limits on
Regulation of Advertising on Government Property, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 607, 627–37 (2000) (describing
“the ongoing muddle of public forum doctrine and commercial/noncommercial distinctions” in cases
involving advertising on government property).
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rather than a legal matter,103 the regulation of naming rights deals raises
problems that go far beyond the schoolhouse. As recounted in Part II, current
policies give school boards few guidelines for selecting sponsors. This leaves
school boards open to charges of viewpoint and content discrimination when
they reject would-be sponsors.104 First Amendment-based challenges are all but
inevitable.
The final Part of this Article explores the constitutional implications of those
challenges. It uses school naming rights to explore the doctrines of government
speech, commercial speech, and schoolhouse speech, in an attempt to clarify
their elusive meanings—and their relationships to each other—by sketching the
ill-defined and sometimes porous boundaries between them. It points out connec-
tions and overlaps where they exist, and argues that the border disputes between
these three categories can never be ignored so long as each of them is focused
not just on a different answer, but on a different question.
A. SCHOOL NAMING RIGHTS AS GOVERNMENT SPEECH: SPEAKER-BASED
CLASSIFICATION
When sorting through the potential “speakers” involved in public school
naming rights deals, the natural place to start is with the schools themselves. As
the naming policies described above demonstrate, many school boards see the
selection of a school’s name as an important opportunity to send a message
about the school or the community. Indeed, naming policies exist specifically
because school boards want to control that message, whether it is acknowledge-
ment of a community leader or simply recognition of a community landmark or
feature. That motivation applies with equal force when selecting or rejecting
paid sponsors. School boards might want to avoid “bad” sponsors because in
effect they are watching their own mouths, and do not want to send a bad
message to their students. If school boards are the ones actually “speaking” for
the purposes of the First Amendment, their sponsor selection decisions may be
considered “government speech,” a classification that gives schools broad discre-
tion to pick and choose sponsors.
103. D. Russakoff, Finding the Wrongs in Naming Rights; School Gym Sponsorship Sparks Furor,
WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2001, at A3 (quoting school board director of corporate development as saying,
“We’re not violating their [students’] rights. We’re getting them a gym.”).
104. On the other hand, “proprietary” regulations on naming rights deals—restrictions that require
contracts of a certain length, or provide deals on a first-come first-served basis, are likely to be upheld.
See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (finding that a city acting in its
proprietary capacity could make reasonable choices concerning the type of advertising displayed in its
public transit vehicles); Hubbard Broad., Inc. v. Metro. Sports Facilities Comm’n, 797 F.2d 552, 556
(8th Cir. 1986) (holding that City acted as proprietor by selling “advertising space on government
property in order to generate revenue” and therefore did not create a public forum).
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1. Defining and Regulating Government Speech
Government speech has a complicated family tree.105 It generally traces its
lineage to a series of cases involving “subsidized” speech, which introduced the
proposition that the government can effectively “speak” through its relation-
ships with private actors.106 The seminal case is Rust v. Sullivan,107 in which the
Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to Title X of the Public
Health Services Act.108 Title X was passed by Congress to “provide[] federal
funding for family-planning services” but it withheld government funds from
services that provided abortions,109 a condition that the services said violated
their First Amendment rights. Finding that the provision was not facially
invalid, the Court held that “[t]he government can, without violating the Consti-
tution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to
be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative
program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.”110 Rust thus
suggested both a broad definition of government speech—including situations
where the government “speaks” by paying private actors—and a generous
standard to govern it: When speaking, even through a private actor, the govern-
ment did not need to be viewpoint neutral.
The Court revisited Rust just a few years later in Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of the University of Virginia,111 holding that a public university could
not refuse to fund certain student publications that expressed belief in a deity.112
On its face, Rosenberger seemed contrary to Rust’s grant of broad governmental
“speaking” authority. Both cases involved First Amendment challenges by
private actors whose activities the government had refused to fund.113 But
105. Note, The Curious Relationship Between the Compelled Speech and Government Speech
Doctrines, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2411, 2432 (2004) (“The government speech line of cases remains the
ugly stepchild of First Amendment doctrine.”). The First Amendment’s family portrait has often been
painted in such unflattering terms. See, e.g., William Van Alstyne, Remembering Melville Nimmer:
Some Cautionary Notes on Commercial Speech, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1635 (1996) (“[T]he Supreme
Court is generally of the view—and has been for twenty years—that commercial speech is not some
kind of orphan left out in the cold under the First Amendment.”).
106. The pioneering work arguing for greater recognition of government as a creator of speech, and
not just as regulator of it, is MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND
GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983).
107. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
108. Id. at 203. Earlier cases implicitly reached the conclusion that Rust eventually adopted. See,
e.g., Muir v. Ala. Educ. Television Comm’n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1044 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
109. Rust, 500 U.S. at 179. Based on this limitation, some have described Rust as a constitutional
conditions case rather than a government speech case. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106
YALE L.J. 151, 169 (1996).
110. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
111. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
112. Id. at 845–46. Although scholars tend to identify Rosenberger as a pillar of the government
speech doctrine, the Court actually approached the case through the lens of forum analysis. See id. at
829–31. This Article addresses public forum analysis in more detail in section III.C.
113. See also Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587–88 (1998) (upholding,
against a viewpoint discrimination challenge, NEA grant-making procedures that funded some constitu-
tionally protected activities but not others).
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whereas Rust denied the challenge, citing the broad discretion of the govern-
ment as a speaker, Rosenberger found that the refusal to fund student publica-
tions was not government speech, and thus not entitled to the same deference.
Justice Kennedy, citing Rust, wrote in Rosenberger that a state may regulate the
content of speech when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to
convey its message, but that it cannot discriminate on the basis of viewpoint
when subsidizing private speakers delivering their own messages.114 The key
difference between Rust and Rosenberger, then, lay in understanding whose
message was really at issue. In Rust, the government enlisted private actors to
deliver a governmental message, whereas in Rosenberger it attempted to discour-
age certain private viewpoints.115 Justice Kennedy repeated this distinction in
Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,116 again reading Rust as protecting the
government’s right to engage in viewpoint discrimination when it speaks, but
not when it subsidizes private speakers.117 The rationale behind this rule derives
from basic democratic principles: “When the government speaks, for instance to
promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the end,
accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy.”118
Extrapolating to the naming rights context, one might say that the “government
speech” of school board officials who enter into objectionable naming rights
deals can always be checked at the next school board election.119
114. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833; see also Latino Officers Ass’n v. New York, 196 F.3d 458,
468 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting, in dicta, that “the government may regulate its own expression in ways that
would be unconstitutional were a private party the speaker”).
115. Later cases suggest, but do not hold, that the religious content of the disputed speech was
behind the Court’s determination in Rosenberger. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S.
98, 111–12 (2001) (“[W]e reaffirm our holdings in Lamb’s Chapel and Rosenberger that speech
discussing otherwise permissible subjects cannot be excluded from a limited public forum on the
ground that the subject is discussed from a religious viewpoint.”).
116. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
117. See id. at 548–49 (overturning statute which provided government funding for public interest
lawyers on the condition that the lawyers not challenge welfare policy); see also Commonwealth v.
Davis, 39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895) (Holmes, J.), aff’d sub nom. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47
(1897) (“For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public
park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private
house to forbid it in his house.”). But see Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“We have no
occasion to determine whether . . . the Davis Case was rightly decided . . . . Wherever the title of streets
and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions.”).
118. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541–42 (quoting Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth,
529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)); see also Johanns v. Livestock Mktg Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 563 (2005).
119. Of course this solution is imperfect, because naming rights contracts are unlikely to respect the
local election cycle, and the ultimate decisions about naming rights deals—at least small ones—might
be made by unelected school officials like school principals. Nevertheless, courts have emphasized the
importance of “accountability” in government speech cases. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235; see Ark.
Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 675 (1998) (noting that broadcasters can be held
“accountable” for the editorial decisions they make); see also Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Who’s Talking?
Disentangling Government and Private Speech, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 35 (2003) (emphasizing
importance of government accountability and the existence of an identifiable message).
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The tenuous distinctions drawn in Rust and Rosenberger left many scratching
their heads about what constitutes government speech,120 and courts have
struggled mightily to identify it.121 Scholars, too, acknowledge that Rust and
Rosenberger’s subsidized speech analysis does not fit easily into any particular
First Amendment framework. As Robert Post pithily notes,
Subsidized speech challenges two fundamental assumptions of ordinary First
Amendment doctrine. It renders uncertain the status of speakers, forcing us to
determine whether speakers should be characterized as independent partici-
pants in the formation of public opinion or instead as instrumentalities of the
government. And it renders uncertain the status of government action, forcing
us to determine whether subsidies should be characterized as government
regulations imposed on persons or instead as a form of government participa-
tion in the marketplace of ideas.122
As a result, the subsidized speech cases do not provide a particularly good
indication of how courts will treat government speech challenges in school
naming rights and other sponsorship cases.123 Rosenberger indicates that the
relevant inquiry is whether the message in any particular case is the govern-
ment’s, even if it is delivered by a private speaker. In the case of public school
naming rights, however, identifying the “message” sent by a school’s name
raises complicated issues of language and meaning that admit no easy answers.
Courts’ faltering attempts to apply government speech analysis to message-
bearing license plates illustrate the challenge. License plates have been one of
the most hotly contested areas of “government speech” ever since the Supreme
Court held in Wooley v. Maynard124 that New Hampshire could not require
people to display the state motto—“Live Free or Die”—on their license plates.125
120. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 5, at 1382 (“More fundamentally, the Rust-Rosenberger distinc-
tion relied upon in Velazquez doesn’t work because it rests on an incoherent theoretical premise, and
lacks a clear understanding of government speech under the Constitution.”); Note, supra note 105, at
2417–18.
121. As Justice Scalia noted in his Velazquez dissent, “If the private doctors’ confidential advice to
their patients at issue in Rust constituted ‘government speech,’ it is hard to imagine what subsidized
speech would not be government speech. . . . Even respondents agree that ‘the true speaker in Rust was
not the government, but the doctor.’” 531 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122. Post, supra note 109, at 152.
123. William T. Mayton, “Buying-Up Speech”: Active Government and the Terms of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 373, 376 (1994) (“[T]he decisions seem
incoherent, a medley of misplaced epigrams (such as ‘no duty to subsidize a right’) and dubious
psychological speculations (such as when choice becomes coercion).”) (internal citation omitted).
124. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
125. See id. at 706–07, 717. Specialty license plates have been the subject of an extensive First
Amendment literature ever since Wooley. The discussion here is intended only to reflect recent
developments. For a more complete, though now somewhat outdated, discussion, see Leslie Gielow
Jacobs, Free Speech and the Limits of Legislative Discretion: The Example of Specialty License Plates,
53 FLA. L. REV. 419 (2001); see also Jacobs, supra note 119, at 98 (“The correct conclusion is that, as
currently run, both vanity and specialty programs are private speech forums. Neither constitutes
legitimate government speech because both accountability and an identifiable message are lacking.”).
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And in a recent series of cases involving factually similar First Amendment
challenges to specialty license plates, Courts of Appeals have come to sharply
divergent conclusions about whether such plates represent government speech
and if they do, whether they violate the Constitution. Courts’ inability to settle
on a definition for government speech in this context—or on a standard govern-
ing that speech even when it has been identified—hints at the difficulty of
applying government speech doctrine to school naming rights arrangements or
any other type of government involvement with speech.
In Planned Parenthood of South Carolina Inc. v. Rose,126 a panel of the
Fourth Circuit agreed on a two sentence long holding affirming the district
court’s judgment that South Carolina’s “Choose Life” plate violated the First
Amendment, but found little other common ground. The three-judge panel
issued three separate opinions regarding why, and how, government speech was
implicated by the plate. Judges Michael and Luttig both found that the speech
involved was “neither purely government speech nor purely private speech, but
a mixture of the two”127—what Judge Luttig called “hybrid” speech.128 Both
judges acknowledged that the Supreme Court has not yet “recognized” that
speech can be simultaneously governmental and private.129 Following the issu-
ance of the splintered panel opinion, and for the second time in two years, the
entire Fourth Circuit voted on whether to hear a government speech license
plate case en banc. And for the second time, by a close vote, it ultimately
decided not to.130 Judge Shedd, dissenting from the denial of rehearing, rejected
the “hybrid” speech argument Judges Michael and Luttig advanced, and opined
that the “license plate is properly characterized as government speech, not
private speech, and is therefore permissible under the First Amendment.”131
Two years later, the Sixth Circuit considered a First Amendment challenge to
what it called a “nearly identical” license plate program,132 but reached an
opposite result. Echoing Judge Shedd, the court found that Tennessee’s “Choose
Life” plates were a “government-crafted message,”133 which was not subject to
126. 361 F.3d 786, 799–800 (4th Cir. 2004). In another license plate case two years prior, the Fourth
Circuit struck down a state restriction prohibiting display of the Confederate flag, finding that it was
intended to suppress the viewpoint of the Sons of Confederate Veterans, who were pushing for the
plate. See Sons of Confederate Veterans Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d
610, 623 (4th Cir. 2002).
127. See Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc., 361 F.3d at 794; id. at 799 (describing the plates as
“mixed speech”).
128. Id. at 800 (Luttig, J., concurring).
129. See id. at 795 (opinion of Michael, J.); id. at 800 (Luttig, J., concurring).
130. Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 373 F.3d 580, 581 (4th Cir. 2004) (denying rehearing
en banc); see also Sons of Confederate Veterans Inc. v. Comm’r of the Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 305
F.3d 241 (4th Cir. 2002) (denying rehearing en banc).
131. Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc., 373 F.3d at 587 (Shedd, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc).
132. ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 380 (6th Cir. 2006).
133. Id. at 375–77.
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a requirement of viewpoint neutrality.134 The Sixth Circuit based its opinion
largely on the Supreme Court’s decision in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
Association,135 which the Sixth Circuit judges read as standing “for the proposi-
tion that when the government determines an overarching message and retains
power to approve every word disseminated at its behest, the message must be
attributed to the government for First Amendment purposes.”136
The divergent classifications in the license plate cases demonstrate the diffi-
culty of classifying state-affiliated messages and establishing a standard to
govern them.137 Both Circuits ultimately identified the government as the
speaker (at least partially) albeit based on different tests. But whereas the only
thing that the three Fourth Circuit judges could agree on was that the plates
represented impermissible viewpoint discrimination, the Sixth Circuit—noting
its disagreement with the Fourth138—upheld Tennessee’s nearly identical li-
cense plate program. The circuits’ inability to agree on the definition of govern-
ment speech or the appropriate level of “protection” to which such speech is
entitled, even in cases that were nearly identical, illustrates quite clearly the
continuing confusion surrounding the government speech doctrine.139
School naming rights cases and other examples of government sponsorship
may give courts an opportunity to either clarify the tenuous distinction between
government and private speech or follow the Fourth Circuit approach and
acknowledge the possibility of “hybrid” speech. Such a clarification of govern-
ment speech’s domain may enable courts to better explain the standard that
governs it. Even smoothing out these wrinkles in the doctrine, however, will not
absolve courts from the difficult, fact-intensive task of identifying government
speech in the first place.
134. Id. at 377–80.
135. 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
136. Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 375 (internal citation omitted).
137. See id. at 380 n.1 (Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Perhaps of some
interest, when this opinion is filed, at least three circuits (4th, 5th, and 6th) will have spoken on the
issue, reaching at least three different conclusions, via at least sixteen separate opinions.”).
138. Id. at 380.
139. Nor are the Fourth and Sixth Circuits the only courts to face down the license-plates-as-
government-speech question. In Henderson v. Stalder, the District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana preliminarily enjoined Louisiana from producing a “Choose Life” license plate specifically
approved by the Louisiana legislature. 112 F. Supp. 2d 589, 602 (E.D. La. 2000), rev’d on other
grounds, 287 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding lack of standing). The court considered the license plate
to be government speech, but ruled that such speech must be viewpoint neutral, blending (without
comment) government speech and forum analysis, thus implicitly recognizing an overlap discussed at
greater length in section III.C.3 of this Article. See id. at 598.
On appeal, a panel of the Fifth Circuit found that the Tax Injunction Act barred jurisdiction, and
vacated the district court’s injunction against the “Choose Life” plates, noting in dicta “our disagree-
ment that the injunction obtained by Keeler is constitutionally appropriate.” Henderson v. Stalder, 407
F.3d 351, 359 (5th Cir. 2005). Eight judges dissented from denial of rehearing en banc. Henderson v.
Stalder, 434 F.3d 352 (2005).
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2. Identifying the Speaker and Message of School Naming Rights
Though the standard governing government speech is itself ill-defined,140 the
confusion it causes pales in comparison to the bewildering task of identifying
government speech. Rust and Rosenberger make it clear that the most important
question is determining whether the government is the one conveying the
message, even if that message is actually delivered by a private agent.141 The
simplicity of the question, however, obscures the difficulty of its application.
The very idea that sponsorship deals could implicate government speech
raises complex and controversial questions regarding the characterization of
speech and sponsorship, and the relationship between private actors and the
government. If commercial buyers of naming rights seek to profit from the
deals—as common sense and sponsors’ own statements suggest142—then it
seems reasonable to assume that they are paying the schools to send a particular
message. They are, in other words, buying the government’s endorsement. If
true, this makes naming rights arrangements look like a form of government
speech: Whether paid or not, the government’s endorsement is the message. On
the other hand, such a broad characterization of government speech would
potentially subject all private speakers who use school facilities to the “govern-
ment speech” standard outlined above.143 If paying for use of a government
facility—whether to place one’s name on it, or to use it more actively—is the
equivalent of buying the government’s endorsement, then even after-school
programs would generally fall into the category of government speech.144 This
would in turn allow schools (the governmental unit doing the speaking) to pick
and choose which groups can use the facilities, simply by claiming that the
selection of participants is itself government speech.
The case law does not provide a single answer to this thorny problem, but it
does suggest interesting and perhaps illuminating questions. At first glance,
school naming rights present almost the reverse scenario from the major
140. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Is Government Speech a Problem?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 373, 386 (1983)
(reviewing MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS: LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN
AMERICA (1983)) (“A definitive answer to the questions that government speech presents would require
definitive conclusions about the effects of communication in general and about the philosophical
purposes and underpinnings of the first amendment.”).
141. Note, supra note 105, at 2412 (“[P]laintiffs have uniformly been willing to accept Rust’s
definition of the battlefield: that is, the only question to be answered is the factual one of who is
speaking.”).
142. See supra notes 45–54 and accompanying text.
143. Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Limited Public Forum:
Unconditional Conditions on “Equal Access” for Religious Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 653, 703 (1996) (“A private speaker in a government-created limited public forum is not the
government.”).
144. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981) (rejecting government speech characteriza-
tion and holding that “an open forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur of state
approval on religious sects or practices.”); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (“[T]he existence
of a Government ‘subsidy,’ in the form of Government-owned property, does not justify the restriction
of speech” in traditional public forums.).
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government speech cases like Rust and Rosenberger. Those cases involved
government subsidies given or denied to private actors attempting to voice
certain messages (in Rust, the government’s; in Rosenberger, their own). Nam-
ing rights arrangements, by contrast, can be characterized as public entities
(schools) accepting private money in exchange for using the government’s
voice to promote the private speaker’s message. This is essentially a “reverse
subsidy”—instead of money flowing from the government to a private speaker,
the money flows from a private actor to the government speaker. That may be
fine as far as it goes, but it does not answer the primary question behind Rust
and Rosenberger: Whose “message” does a school’s name deliver?145 If the
message is the government’s, then school names can properly be considered
government speech. And that theory is only plausible if one can reasonably
imagine what message the government might be sending through the names of
public schools. At least two possibilities stand out.
The first potential message schools might send through their names is one
about the school itself or the community in which it is based. Specifically,
schools might use their names to either associate themselves with or extol the
virtues of a historical figure (for example, George Washington High) or to
reaffirm their attachment to a certain community (for example, Durham High).
The same rationale, of course, applies to school facilities such as stadiums (for
example, Steve Turner Stadium, named after a popular coach). This theory of
school names seems to be borne out at least partially by the wording of naming
policies themselves, many of which specifically recognize that a school’s name
sends an important message about the school.146 In fact, school board policies
sometimes describe school names as not just a matter of public image, but as
part of the curriculum. To take just one example, Rochester, New York, has a
naming rights policy that explicitly connects the naming of schools to the
schools’ educational mission:
This policy is based upon the belief that it is important that the students and
public know of the many contributions of many Rochester leaders of the past
and other national heroes, and that this knowledge can be more strongly
imprinted through classroom discussion and projects related to school names.147
Other naming policies explicitly recognize that “[t]he name of a public school
or public school facility should be an appropriate representation and reflection
145. See Note, supra note 105, at 2412.
146. COBB COUNTY (GA.) SCH. DIST. BD. OF EDUC, supra note 93 (“The Cobb County School District
(District) recognizes that the official names of its facilities are vital to their public image.”); see also
CARTERET COUNTY (N.C.) PUB. SCH. SYS. BD. OF EDUC., supra note 90 (“The naming or renaming of a
school or the creation of a commemorative or memorial is a matter deserving the thoughtful attention of
the Board of Education.”).
147. ROCHESTER (N.Y.) CITY SCH. DIST. BD. OF EDUC., supra note 88.
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of the school or school-community.”148 These policies strongly suggest that the
districts that drafted them have not only recognized the existence of the
message sent through their schools’ names, but have actually claimed the
message as their own. Extrapolating to the naming rights context, school boards
might plausibly argue that the schools’ names represent government speech
even where they are named after private actors. Nobody thinks that naming a
school “Jefferson High” is an act of speech by the deceased president or his
estate, after all. Indeed, Rust demonstrates that the government is still the
speaker even when it hires a private actor (a named sponsor, for example) to
deliver its message. The Court’s recent decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos149
implicitly reaffirmed this reading of the government speech doctrine. In Garc-
etti, the Court held that statements made by public officials pursuant to their
official duties are not protected by the First Amendment.150 If using a private
actor’s voice to proclaim the government’s message constitutes government
speech, it is difficult to imagine how using that private actor’s name would be
any different.
The second potential government message sent by a school’s name is an
endorsement of the person or entity after whom the school is named.151 This, of
course, is the kind of message that corporate sponsors clearly hope the school
will send.152 Although it shades somewhat into simple “advertising,” the “en-
dorsement” reading actually seems to fit well with the Supreme Court’s prior
treatment of government speech. As recounted above, government speech as a
First Amendment concept essentially evolved from cases involving subsidies to
private speakers. The implicit endorsement given to sponsors of school facilities
could be seen as just such a “subsidy,” and—as the dollar value of naming
rights contracts suggests—a valuable one at that. The fact that the government
gives such endorsements pursuant to paid contracts does not necessarily change
the analysis. Indeed, courts in two recent cases found that government acknowl-
edgment of financial sponsors constituted government speech.153 Neither case,
148. HAW. BD. OF EDUC., supra note 91; see also NEWTON-CONOVER (N.C.) CITY SCH. BD. OF EDUC.,
NCCS POLICY, Policy No. 7302 (2000), available at http://www.nccs.k12.nc.us/Policy/Policy7000.doc.
(“[N]aming or renaming a facility [is] a significant endeavor since the name of a facility can reflect
upon the students, staff, school district and community.”).
149. 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
150. Id. at 1960.
151. Establishment Clause jurisprudence offers an analogue to this “endorsement” theory. See, e.g.,
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968). But because religious speech raises thorny complica-
tions beyond the scope of this Article, I do not rely on those cases here.
152. See ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredsen, 441 F.3d 370, 376 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[T]here is no reason to
doubt that a group’s ability to secure a specialty [license] plate amounts to state approval.”); Jacobs,
supra note 119, at 91 (“Unquestionably, groups are motivated to participate in the [Adopt-A-Highway]
program because of the acknowledgement that they will receive. But that motivation does not mean that
it is the groups that are speaking.”).
153. Wells v. City and County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1140 (10th Cir. 2001) (“In the plaintiffs’
view . . . the plain language of the sign demonstrates that it is a message from—not to—the sponsors,
and they assert that they are equally entitled to communicate their message from within the fence. We
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however, identified the theory behind its determination.
Some cases and commentators have suggested that courts attempting to apply
or justify such an “endorsement” approach should consider whether those
receiving the message would recognize it as the government’s.154 And although
many courts have suggested that they would favor such a test,155 the Supreme
Court all but foreclosed that approach in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
Association,156 which involved a First Amendment challenge to the compelled
contributions required by the Beef Promotion and Research Act (“BPRA”). The
Court held that the government could characterize the advertisements paid for
by the BPRA as “government speech” even if a reasonable observer might not
understand that the government was speaking.157 Some scholars have called for
a more observer-centered jurisprudence,158 but their proposed solution—
requiring the government to identify itself when speaking159—does not obviate
the need to ask difficult questions. If anything, an observer-focused approach
further highlights the tenuousness of the distinction between government endorse-
ment of speakers espousing the government’s position (which is government
speech, according to Rust), and government endorsement of private speakers
with their own messages (which is not government speech, according to Rosen-
berger). Does the name on a school really send a government message of
endorsement? Or is it simply the equivalent of allowing a private sponsor to use
the school as a billboard? If it is the latter, is that acquiescence enough to
constitute an endorsement, especially when the sponsor has paid for the privi-
lege?
The answer to the last question, perhaps surprisingly, may turn out to be yes,
so long as the school board (that is, the government) played an active role in
selecting the sponsor. In prior cases, courts have interpreted selection and
presentation of programming and broadcasting as a kind of speech. In Arkansas
conclude that the sign is Denver’s speech, not that of the listed corporations.”); Knights of the KKK v.
Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1093 (8th Cir. 2000).
154. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 578 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“It
means nothing that Government officials control the message if that fact is never required to be made
apparent to those who get the message, let alone if it is affirmatively concealed from them.”); see also
Bezanson & Buss, supra note 5, at 1384 (arguing that “government speech should be limited to
purposeful action by government, expressing its own distinct message, which is understood by those
who receive it to be the government’s message.”) (emphasis added); Dolan, supra note 79, at 74–75
(“Where an affiliation resembles a partnership, so that the public will perceive government approval of
a sponsor’s message, government should retain control over selection and the government speech
analysis should apply.”) (emphasis added); id. at 123 (“What should be essential to the reasonable
observer is both the nature of the affiliation and the government’s relationship overall to the speakers in
the program or venue.”).
155. Dolan, supra note 79, at 118.
156. 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
157. Id. at 563–64. But see id. at 564 n.7 (“If a viewer would identify the speech as respondents’,
however, the analysis would be different.”).
158. Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983, 988,
1051 (2005).
159. Id. at 1052–54.
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Educational Television Commission v. Forbes,160 for example, the Supreme
Court found that “[w]hen a public broadcaster exercises editorial discretion in
the selection and presentation of its programming, it engages in speech activi-
ty.”161 Like the selection of an artist for a show or a political candidate for a
televised debate—both of which are usually made pursuant to a policy and a
history of active control—a school board’s choice of named sponsors could
amount to government speech.162
3. School Naming Rights as Compelled Speech
Government speech essentially operates as an “exception” to the First Amend-
ment, allowing the government to say what it wants even when speaking
through private mouthpieces. But what of those mouthpieces? Do they have a
First Amendment right to keep quiet when they disagree with the government’s
message? Perhaps the real driving force behind objections to school naming
rights will be private actors’ objection to being enlisted, by the government, as
endorsers of a sponsor whose message or viewpoint they find odious. Students,
teachers, coaches, and others associated with a school may object that naming
rights deals force them to convey the government’s message, and thus that their
free speech rights are being threatened.
The Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutionally significant
difference between compelled silence and compelled speech,163 and it has
suggested that a particular speech act may be subject to scrutiny as compelled
speech even if it is classified as government speech.164 Indeed, students have
successfully challenged particular school requirements on exactly those grounds.
In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,165 the Court invalidated a state
law requiring public school students to salute and pledge allegiance to the flag,
holding that that the law required an affirmation of belief166 and thus violated
the First Amendment. Justice Jackson held for the Court:
160. 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
161. Id. at 674; see also Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 585–86 (1998)
(finding that viewpoint neutrality is not required in selection of art exhibits for public funding). Randall
Bezanson has suggested that “Forbes may be the first decision expressly acknowledging the First
Amendment significance of government’s role as a speaker.” Randall P. Bezanson, The Government
Speech Forum: Forbes and Finley and Government Speech Selection Judgments, 83 IOWA L. REV. 953,
961 (1998) (footnoted omitted).
162. See Dolan, supra note 79, at 110 (“To show government speech, a municipality must show that
it has actively screened each potential private speaker and allowed only those which the administrators
conclude further program goals.”) (internal citations omitted).
163. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n for the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796–97 (1988); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705, 714 (1977) (holding that the First Amendment’s guarantees “include[] both the right to speak
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all”).
164. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717.
165. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). But see Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM
L. REV. 451, 469, 473–75 (1995) (suggesting that if reasonable observers would understand the action
as being compelled, it would not be not expressive and not truly “speech”).
166. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633.
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If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess
by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit
an exception, they do not now occur to us.167
A school’s name may not be freighted with quite the same political and social
import as the pledge of allegiance or the flag, but it is easy to imagine that a
sponsor’s identity could be just as controversial. As the debate about school-
house commercialism and the ‘Coke Day’ incident demonstrates,168 many
students consider corporate branding to be a matter of considerable political and
social import, and they are willing to speak out against it. A student who
strongly opposed a particular corporate sponsor might argue that being forced to
acknowledge or support that sponsor amounted to a compelled acknowledge-
ment or endorsement of the sponsor on the student’s part, since she must not
only attend the named facility but also endorse the sponsor by displaying its
name on her diploma,169 school uniform, or sports jersey.170 Since students have
a qualified First Amendment right to wear black armbands to school,171 they
might also have a First Amendment right not to wear sponsor-endorsed shirts or
jerseys.
But there are also signals to the contrary. In Wooley, then-Justice Rehnquist
wrote in dissent that a person seeking to invoke a compelled speech claim must
show that the state “place[s] the citizen in the position of either apparently or
actually ‘asserting as true’ the message.”172 Thirty years later, Chief Justice
Roberts picked up this thread and wove it into the Court’s unanimous opinion in
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.173 That decision
upheld the Solomon Amendment, which provides that an entire educational
institution will lose federal funds if any part of the institution denies military
recruiters the same access given to other kinds of recruiters. The Court held that
the Solomon Amendment, unlike the laws at issue in Barnette and Wooley,
“does not dictate the content of the speech at all, which is only ‘compelled’ if,
and to the extent, the school provides such speech for other recruiters.”174
Although it is impossible to accurately predict how any particular naming
rights policy will be categorized, the framework described here does identify
167. Id. at 642.
168. See supra notes 12–17.
169. Lynn Hicks, College Sees Dollar Signs on Its Sign, USA TODAY, Aug. 1, 2007, at 1A (“A
college diploma could soon come with a corporate name.”).
170. Bruce Darrow, the Brooklawn School Board President who led the initial naming rights drive,
said in 2004, “It’s the wave of the future. I’m looking into selling advertising on the children’s
basketball uniforms.” Pennington, supra note 30.
171. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
172. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 721 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
173. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
174. Id. at 1308.
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some of the factors on which courts are likely to rely. The single most important
factor will probably be the degree of control that school boards exert over their
names. As in the programming-selection cases like Forbes, an active role in
sponsor selection—especially when done pursuant to a written policy—is the
easiest way for a school board to claim ownership over the message sent by its
schools’ names. Boards that actively select sponsors and tightly control the
presentation of their names are most likely to be characterized as government
speakers. This is potentially a bad result for would-be sponsors, because it gives
school boards wide discretion to reject sponsors based even on the “viewpoint”
those sponsors express. Sponsors are thus likely to counter the government
speech characterization by arguing that naming rights are their own private
speech—whether commercial or otherwise—and thus entitled to heightened
protection. The following section considers the viability of that argument.
B. SCHOOL NAMING RIGHTS AS COMMERCIAL SPEECH: CONTENT-BASED
CLASSIFICATION
Whereas the government speech standard appears to apply with equal force
regardless of what kind of speech the government engages in,175 private actors’
speech is regulated by a variety of different standards depending on the content
of the speech,176 rather than just the identity of the speaker.177 In the school
naming rights context, the most prominent non-governmental speakers are the
sponsors themselves, most of whom are businesses. The content of their speech
is often “commercial.” And in an unsteady and somewhat unpredictable line of
cases, the Supreme Court has held that restrictions on commercial speech are
subject to a form of intermediate scrutiny. This section describes the ill-defined
category of commercial speech and the protections to which it is entitled, then
assesses whether school naming rights fit into that category. In doing so, the
discussion highlights some of the problematic border disputes between commer-
cial speech, government speech, and forum analysis.
1. The Definition and Protection of Commercial Speech
Over the past few decades, the Supreme Court has created and expanded First
Amendment protection for commercial speech in two ways: First, by narrowing
its definition—thus leaving more seemingly commercial speech in the fully
protected realm of pure speech—and second, by imposing more significant
restrictions on government attempts to regulate commercial speech. This section
addresses each of those developments in turn.
Although the Supreme Court has never articulated a definition of “commer-
175. See subsection III.C.3 for a discussion of government-commercial speech.
176. The following section on forum analysis addresses the relevance of the speaker’s location.
177. Of course, a speaker’s identity may be relevant for determining the content of its speech.
Commercial entities are to some degree presumed to engage in commercial speech, but not necessarily
exclusively so. See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text and infra notes 202 & 236 and
accompanying text.
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cial speech,” neither has it bemoaned the lack of one.178 Instead, the Court has
“recited various descriptions, indicia, and disclaimers without settling upon a
precise and comprehensive definition.”179 In one of the first and best-recognized
attempts to impose order on the category, Justice Blackmun suggested in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council180 that
commercial speech is that which does “‘no more than propose a commercial
transaction.’”181 Blackmun’s formulation covered such obviously commercial
messages as price bulletins and coupons, but seemed to exclude the vast
majority of actual advertising, which generally does more than simply “propose
a commercial transaction.” How, for example, would a court classify an advertise-
ment for a July 4th sale, if it included both price information and patriotic
images and messages? Rather than disentangle commercial components from
their noncommercial cousins, subsequent cases tended to extend full First
Amendment protection to such “mixed-motives” speech.182 This approach gener-
ally followed Blackmun’s formulation, which regarded as commercial only that
which was exclusively so. The mixed-message/full protection approach also
preserved the existence of the commercial speech category while simulta-
neously extending full First Amendment protection to a wide range of commer-
cially tinged speech. In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind,183 for
example, the Supreme Court held that a North Carolina statute governing
solicitation of charitable contributions was an unconstitutional restriction on
noncommercial speech.184 That the speakers in the case—professional fundrais-
ers—sought money for their organizations and themselves did not, the Court
found, render their speech “commercial.” Instead, the Court held that where the
component parts of a single speech act are “inextricably intertwined,” courts
cannot “parcel out the speech, applying one test to one phrase and another test
to another phrase. Such an endeavor would be both artificial and impracti-
cal.”185 The Court thus treated mixed-message speech as fully protected expres-
sion,186 suggesting that the addition of a partially noncommercial message can
178. Some scholars attribute this imprecision to the inherent difficulties of classifying commercial
speech. See Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 7
(2000); Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV. 55,
146 (1999).
179. Stern, supra note 178, at 56; see also Piety, supra note 55, at 381.
180. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
181. Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1976)); see also Thomas C. Goldstein, Nike v. Kasky and the Definition of “Commercial
Speech”, 2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 63, 72 (referring to this as the “most often-repeated” definition of
commercial speech the Court has offered).
182. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (invalidating on First Amendment
grounds an ordinance and license tax on evangelists, and finding that the “sale” of religious literature
does not turn evangelism into commercial speech).
183. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
184. Id. at 789, 798.
185. Id. at 796.
186. Id.
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remove speech from the commercial category. But the Court revisited and
limited Riley just one year later in Board of Trustees of the State University of
New York v. Fox,187 saying that the commercial and protected speech in Riley
“was ‘inextricably intertwined’ because the state law required it to be in-
cluded.”188 Fox, by contrast, involved a university’s attempts to ban on-campus
Tupperware parties. Opponents of the ban cited Riley and argued that the
Tupperware parties involved “inextricably intertwined” messages, since they
“touch[ed] on other subjects . . . such as how to be financially responsible and
how to run an efficient home.”189 The Court rejected this contention, saying that
“[n]o law of man or of nature makes it impossible to sell housewares without
teaching home economics, or to teach home economics without selling house-
wares.”190 Riley and Fox thus reinforce, albeit from different angles, the basic
point that the best way to protect a particular act of “commercial” speech is not
to classify it as such.
This broad protection for “mixed-message” speech has massive practical
import, because very little modern commercial advertising falls into the “purely”
commercial approach Justice Blackmun envisioned in Virginia Pharmacy. To-
day, traditional “product identification” advertising is vanishingly rare. Indeed,
“[a] great deal—perhaps even almost all—corporate advertising expression
does not have anything at all to do with the transmission of information. It has
rather to do with the creation of emotional associations, especially associations
that will help induce a favorable, and even a desirous, attitude towards the
product in question.”191 But while advertising itself has changed greatly over
the years, the commercial speech doctrine remains faithfully wedded to out-
dated indicia of commercialism such as product placement and price informa-
tion. Those factors, which essentially echo Justice Blackmun’s Virginia Pharmacy
definition, are increasingly divorced from what most companies (not to mention
potential consumers) consider to be advertising. If the definition of commercial
speech remains so limited, not only will naming rights fall outside of its realm,
but its defenders will find themselves manning the ramparts of an increasingly
empty castle.
The Supreme Court’s solicitous approach to mixed messages has greatly
187. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
188. Id. at 474.
189. Id.
190. Id.; see also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
563 & n.5 (1980) (refusing to grant full free speech protection to speech simply because it “links a
product to a current public debate”); N.Y. Magazine v. Metro. Transit Auth., 987 F. Supp. 254, 262 &
n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (denying full protection and finding that, although a New York Magazine ad
“inextricably intertwined” its political and commercial messages, the former was simply representative
of the kind of commentary the magazine was selling), vacated in part by N.Y. Magazine v. Metro
Transit Auth., 136 F.3d 123 (1998).
191. ROGER A. SHINER, FREEDOM OF COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION 308 (2003); see also Piety, supra note
55, at 371; Scot Silverglate, Comment, Subliminal Perception and the First Amendment: Yelling Fire in
a Crowded Mind?, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1243, 1261 n.153 (1990) (citing VANCE PACKARD, THE HIDDEN
PERSUADERS 7–8 (1957) (quoting Louis Cheskin)).
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narrowed the scope of commercial speech, but the category is not yet entirely
empty. In fact, the Court has come to rely on a case-by-case, factor-driven
approach that occasionally extends the boundaries of commercial speech in
unexpected ways. The Court’s ad hoc approach traces back to Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Products Corp,192 which arose when the United States Postal Service
barred a manufacturer, seller, and distributor of contraceptives from sending
unsolicited mailings to individuals. The Court found that its case law had
recognized “‘the ‘common-sense’ distinction between speech proposing a com-
mercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government
regulation, and other varieties of speech.’”193 Applying that “common sense”
approach, the Court found that the pamphlets were commercial speech not
because of the economic motivation behind them, nor because they referenced
specific products, nor even because the parties agreed that they were advertise-
ments, but rather due to a combination of all three factors.194 In spite of its
“mixed-messages” jurisprudence, the Court found that “[t]he mailings constitute
commercial speech notwithstanding the fact that they contain discussions of
important public issues such as venereal disease and family planning.”195
The Court’s steadfast commitment to Bolger’s ad hoc approach has led to
confusion and occasional controversy. Indeed, the Court itself has repeatedly
noted that its jurisprudence does not lead to predictable answers.196 Controversy
over commercial speech bubbled to the surface most recently in Kasky v.
Nike,197 a California Supreme Court case on which the United States Supreme
Court granted, and then controversially dismissed, certiorari.198 Responding to
allegations that it abused workers in overseas sweatshops, Nike published a
series of “editorial advertisements,” press releases, and letters sent to newspa-
pers and universities.199 Mark Kasky, a private citizen, alleged that this informa-
tion campaign contained false and misleading statements made “with knowledge
or reckless disregard of the laws of California prohibiting false and misleading
statements,”200 and that Nike could not claim the full protection of the First
Amendment. The California Supreme Court agreed, finding that the “public
relations” statements Nike made denying any illegal or unsafe working condi-
tions in its factories were commercial speech entitled only to lessened First
192. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
193. Id. at 64 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n., 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978)).
194. Id. at 67–68.
195. Id. (footnote omitted).
196. See, e.g., Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993) (acknowledging “the
difficulty of drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct category”);
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 765 (1993) (“[A]mbiguities may exist at the margins of the category of
commercial speech.”); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (“[S]ub-
ject to doubt, perhaps, are the precise bounds of the category of expression that may be termed
commercial speech . . . . ”).
197. 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1099, cert. dismissed, 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
198. Id.
199. Goldstein, supra note 181, at 65.
200. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 248.
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Amendment protection.201 The court justified this determination on three major
grounds. First, it found that the speaker, Nike, was engaged in commerce.202
Second, the court held that the intended audience was likely to be actual or
potential buyers.203 And finally, the court found that the factual message con-
veyed was commercial in character in that it made representations of fact about
Nike’s business operations, products, or services.204 The California court’s
framework set off a firestorm of academic and popular debate, most of it
negative, and all of it calling for clarification from the United States Supreme
Court.205 The Court granted cert, heard oral argument, and then—as First
Amendment scholars waited anxiously—dismissed cert as improvidently granted,
sparking written dissents from Justices Kennedy206 and Breyer207 and dooming
commercial speech to the same twilight of ill-definition it has endured since its
birth.208 The Bolger rule (or lack thereof) thus seems to be the prevailing
“standard” for defining what is and is not commercial speech.
Just as the debate over commercial speech’s definition has continued without
resolution up until the present day, so too has its standard of protection
fluctuated over the years. Under the rule of 1942’s Valentine v. Christensen,209
purveyors of commercial speech could not count on any First Amendment
protection whatsoever, even when they mixed their commercial messages with
“political” ones.210 In 1976, however, the Court set the stage for an entirely new
analysis, striking down a Virginia statute that forbade pharmacists from publish-
ing prescription drug prices. In Virginia Pharmacy, the opinion in which Justice
Blackmun ventured a definition of commercial speech, the Court held for the
first time that “speech which does ‘no more than propose a commercial transac-
201. Id. at 315; see also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 563 n.5 (1980) (declaring difference between “direct comments on public issues” and statements
about public policy “made only in the context of commercial transactions”). See generally Piety, supra
note 55.
202. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 258.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, What Is Commercial Speech? The Issue Not
Decided in Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1143 (2004); Ronald K.L. Collins & David M.
Skover, The Landmark Free-Speech Case That Wasn’t: The Nike v. Kasky Story, 54 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 965 (2004); J. Wesley Earnhardt, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky: A Golden Opportunity To Define Commer-
cial Speech—Why Wouldn’t the Supreme Court Finally “Just Do It™”?, 82 N.C. L. REV. 797 (2004);
Goldstein, supra note 181; Robert M. O’Neil, Nike v. Kasky—What Might Have Been . . ., 54 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1259 (2004).
206. Nike Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 665 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting from dismissal of
certiorari).
207. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari)
208. See generally Collins & Skover, supra note 205; Samuel A. Terilli, Nike v. Kasky and the
Running-but-Going-Nowhere Commercial Speech Debate, 10 COMM. L. & POL’Y 383 (2005).
209. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
210. Id. at 54–55 (upholding constitutionality of municipal ordinance forbidding distribution of
printed handbills for commercial advertising in the streets, even though half of the handbill in question
was devoted to a nominally political protest). Valentine predated the mixed-message cases discussed
above.
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tion’” is not “so removed from any ‘exposition of ideas,’ and from ‘truth,
science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the
administration of Government’” that it should be completely without protec-
tion.211 The Court emphasized potential patients’ need to access information
about drug prices,212 finding that even if an advertiser’s motives were purely
economic, his speech was entitled to some level of protection.213
Having established in Virginia Pharmacy that commercial speech is covered
by the First Amendment, the Court established a four-step analysis to test
restrictions on commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission of New York.214 The first prong of that test asks
whether the speech at issue “concerns lawful activity and [is not] mislead-
ing.”215 If the speech fails this initial inquiry, it receives no First Amendment
protection at all.216 If it passes, then the second prong assesses whether the
government’s interest is “substantial.”217 The third prong asks whether the
regulation directly advances the government interest asserted,218 and the fourth
and final prong measures the breadth of the regulation to see if it is more
extensive than necessary to serve the stated interest.219 Though the second and
third prongs are relatively simple for a government regulation to meet,220 the
final prong has become an increasingly significant obstacle. In Central Hudson
itself, the Court struck down the challenged regulation—which would have
completely banned all promotional activity by electric utility companies as
contrary to a national policy of conserving energy—as being more extensive
than necessary.221 The Court’s more recent jurisprudence, however, has clarified
that the fourth prong of Central Hudson allows the government some leeway in
its regulations. In Fox, the Court held that a regulation on commercial speech
211. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)
(internal citations omitted).
212. Id. at 754–56, 763–65.
213. Id. at 762.
214. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
215. Id. at 566.
216. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 504–05 (1982) (holding that the government may
entirely ban commercial speech that proposes illegal transactions); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1,
15–16 (1979) (upholding statute prohibiting the practice of optometry under misleading names); see
also Jeffrey Lefstin, Note, Does the First Amendment Bar Cancellation of REDSKINS?, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 665, 691 (2000) (exploring whether the trademark REDSKINS constitutes commercial speech).
217. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. The Court has upheld as valid government interests the promotion of energy conservation,
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568, the prevention of drunkenness, 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island,
517 U.S. 484 (1996), and the protection of public safety from the dangers of compounded drugs,
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002). See also Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S.
618 (1995) (applying Central Hudson and finding that Florida Bar rules prohibiting lawyers from using
direct mail to solicit personal injury clients within thirty days of their injury easily met the first three
prongs and more narrowly met the fourth as well).
221. 447 U.S. at 569–72.
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need not be the least restrictive measure available, so long as it is a “fit that is
not necessarily perfect, but reasonable” between means and ends.222
Central Hudson has endured as a test, though its application has been
uneven.223 Many early cases suggested that the nominal protection accorded to
commercial speech was essentially illusory. In a splintered opinion in Metrome-
dia, Inc. v. San Diego,224 four Justices found that San Diego’s complete ban on
all outdoor advertising display signs met the requirements for regulating commer-
cial speech because it “directly advance[d]” governmental interests and was not
overbroad.225 Five years later, the Court’s protection of commercial speech
“undoubtedly reached its nadir”226 in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v.
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico.227 In Posadas, the Court upheld Puerto Rico’s flat
prohibition on advertising about casinos.228 Writing for the Court, then-Justice
Rehnquist suggested that since Puerto Rico could ban casino gambling alto-
gether, it was also entitled to restrict gambling advertisements.229 Posadas led a
short and troubled life, however, and was repudiated in 1996 by 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island.230 In 44 Liquormart, the Court held that a complete ban on
price advertising for liquor violated the First Amendment because it failed both
the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson: It did not materially advance the
state’s interest, and in any case was more extensive than necessary.231 Justice
Stevens wrote in his plurality opinion that “when a State entirely prohibits the
dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons
unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason
to depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally de-
mands.”232 Thus, 44 Liquormart signaled a new and increasingly protective era
222. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. at 469, 480 (1989); see also Fla. Bar v. Went
For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995) (holding that a regulation barring solicitation to prospective
personal injury clients is not overbroad simply because it fails to distinguish between degrees of
injury); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001) (citing Florida Bar and striking
down state restriction on tobacco advertising).
223. Post, supra note 178, at 5 (“The fundamental flaw in contemporary commercial speech
doctrine, however, is that its primary doctrinal standard, the so-called Central Hudson test, is so vague
and abstract as to fail entirely to express any specific constitutional values.”).
224. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
225. Id. at 508–13 (plurality opinion) (striking down the regulation on other First Amendment
grounds).
226. Stern, supra note 178, at 65.
227. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
228. Id. at 344 (“In short, we conclude that the statute and regulations at issue in this case, as
construed by the Superior Court, pass muster under each prong of the Central Hudson test. We
therefore hold that the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico properly rejected appellant’s First Amendment
claim.”).
229. Id. at 346. Students of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s jurisprudence might note the shades of his
“bitter with the sweet” jurisprudence, first and most famously articulated in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 153–54 (1974). Rehnquist nevertheless concluded in Posadas that the commercial speech at issue
“concern[ed] a lawful activity and [was] not misleading or fraudulent.” Posadas, 478 U.S. at 340–41.
230. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
231. Id. at 505–08.
232. Id. at 501.
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of commercial speech doctrine.233 Having restricted the definition of commer-
cial speech—thus giving full First Amendment protection to more business-
related speech—the Court has also increased the protections accorded to
commercial speech.234
2. Naming Rights to Public School Facilities as Commercial Speech
Although commercial speech doctrine is in a state of flux, with both the
definition and the standard changing greatly in the last ten years, it is nonethe-
less clearly implicated in the regulation of naming rights arrangements.
The initial question, of course, is whether naming rights to public school
facilities (or indeed any other government sponsorship arrangement) can prop-
erly be considered “commercial” speech. The ad hoc test described in Bolger—
and which the Court declined to clarify in Kasky—makes this a nearly impossible
question to answer in the abstract, aside from a few predictions about how
courts will approach the question. Courts are likely to look to the sponsor’s
motivations and identity, and the actual placement or use of the sponsor’s name
or logo in the school. For example, an individual’s name—even one like Ken
Lay’s which is closely connected to a company’s—would probably be classified
as noncommercial speech, since it does not specifically identify a product being
sold. On the other hand, a company—or even individual, such as Calvin
Klein—which shares a name with the product it sells would be in a more
questionable position. The analysis gets even more complicated when one
considers the impact of logos, which contribute to the commercial character of a
naming rights deal.235 Thus, naming rights to Nike High School might be
classified as noncommercial speech, but if the Nike “Swoosh” logo were added,
or if the name were affixed to an athletic facility where Nike products are used,
the effect would undoubtedly be commercial.236
Nike and other would-be sponsors, however, might argue that commercial
speech, unlike government speech, is not a category whose boundaries are
defined by the identity of the speaker alone. Bolger may not provide a single,
overarching test for classifying commercial speech, but it does suggest that
courts must consider the speaker’s message, audience and motivations as
233. See Developments in the Law—Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2169, 2275–82
(2004); Stern, supra note 178, at 72 (“The splintered opinions in 44 Liquormart should not obscure the
fact that this decision heralded a more protective attitude toward commercial speech.”).
234. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); see also Note, Making Sense of
Hybrid Speech: A New Model for Commercial Speech and Expressive Conduct, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2836, 2854 (2005); Stern, supra note 178, at 58.
235. Note, supra note 234, at 2849 (“Despite their expressive characteristics and similarities to both
commercial speech and expressive conduct, exterior product designs currently do not receive any First
Amendment protection.”).
236. See id. at 2839 n.14.
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well.237 Balancing these factors is no easy task. As discussed above,238 most
sponsors enter into school naming rights deals at least partially for commercial
purposes. Indeed, naming rights deals are in many ways perfectly representative
of modern advertising, which is less concerned with making explicit claims
about products (as envisioned by Justice Blackmun’s formulation in Virginia
Pharmacy) than with creating positive associations in the minds of potential
consumers. Scholars of advertising have long recognized that “[s]ponsorship is
an integral part of modern marketing, which seeks to integrate commercial
products into all aspects of social interactions, creating cultural icons and
symbols.”239
Naming rights cases would, however, offer courts an intriguing opportunity
to suggest a new framework for adjudicating “mixed-message” speech. Such
“mixed” speech is becoming increasingly common, as corporations enter into
naming rights deals and other public relations actions that are intended to help
the company’s bottom line commercially, but could also very easily be de-
scribed as political or even charitable.240 The dispute over Nike’s speech in
Kasky illustrates the point and the context quite clearly,241 and highlights the
difficult questions courts face when resolving mixed-motive speech cases. Will
courts continue to classify each act of speech as completely commercial or
noncommercial, or can a single act of speech be broken down into separate
messages that are governed by different standards? Or, even more interestingly,
will courts begin recognizing “hybrid” commercial speech, as some judges have
done with regard to government speech?242
In the naming rights context, answering this question could lead to very
interesting results. A court might find, for example, that a corporate donor’s gift
to a school is charitable noncommercial speech entitled to full First Amendment
protection, but that emblazoning the donor’s name on the side of the building is
commercial speech, or even, as suggested in section III.A, government speech.
After the detail-dependent classification question is resolved, the next ques-
237. Nor would motivation alone be sufficient. Even if we “assume that the advertiser’s interest is a
purely economic one” that fact alone “hardly disqualifies him from protection under the First Amend-
ment.” Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
238. See supra notes 47–55 and accompanying text.
239. STACY SAETTA & JIM MOSHER, PAC. INST. FOR RESEARCH AND EVALUATION, CAN A LOCAL
ORDINANCE LIMIT ALCOHOL SPONSORSHIP AND ADVERTISING? AN INTRODUCTION 1, available at http://camy.org/
action/pdf/SponsorshipOrdinanceSummary.pdf.
240. See generally Piety, supra note 55, at 373–74, 400–10.
241. Nike essentially argued that its statements fell well outside of even a broad definition of
commercial speech, and additionally suggested that the definition of commercial speech might be
limited to speech that “addresses the qualities of a product as such (like its price, availability, or
suitability)” and appears in an “advertisement” or “product label.” Brief for the Petitioners at 21, Nike
v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 898993; see also id., at 6, 24, 27, 30, 35–36
(suggesting that commercial speech is narrowly defined). Kasky’s response echoed the California
Supreme Court opinion, arguing inter alia that Nike’s statements provided consumers with information
to aid their buying decisions, and was intended to induce purchases of Nike products. Brief for
Respondent at 29–35, Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 1844849.
242. Id. at 800 (Luttig, J., concurring) (describing the license plates as “hybrid” speech).
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tion will be whether school boards’ attempts to regulate naming rights pass
Central Hudson’s four-prong test. The first prong is unlikely to be relevant,
since sponsors’ messages are generally neither illegal nor misleading. School
boards should also be able to easily meet the second prong by showing that the
government’s interest in regulating naming rights is derived from its “substan-
tial” interest in public education.243 As in recent cases such as 44 Liquormart,
the real action in the application of Central Hudson would likely come at the
third and fourth prongs. The third prong asks whether the regulation at issue
directly advances the government interest asserted. In order to pass this prong of
the test, a school board would be well-served to revisit the decades-old battles
over commercialism in schools, and the reams of information it generated
regarding the effect of advertising on children and commercialism’s impact on
schools’ educational missions.244 Doing so would emphasize the connection
between commercial naming rights and schools’ educational missions, and
show how naming rights regulations could directly advance the government’s
interest in education.
The fourth prong—overbreadth, which doomed the regulation at issue in
Central Hudson—will also be particularly relevant in naming rights cases. Prior
to 44 Liquormart, overbreadth was almost impossible to establish, as the
Supreme Court repeatedly upheld total bans on entire classes of advertise-
ments.245 But 44 Liquormart revitalized the fourth prong of Central Hudson,
making it clear that even if the narrowness inquiry is not as harsh as strict
scrutiny, it nonetheless requires the state to carry a “heavy burden.”246 In
shouldering that burden, the government would do well to connect Central
Hudson’s second and fourth prongs, by arguing that the strength of the govern-
mental interest in educating children is so strong (a second prong issue) that
even a large degree of overbreadth is permissible (a fourth prong issue).
243. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (“We have repeatedly acknowledged
the overriding importance of preparing students for work and citizenship, describing education as
pivotal to ‘sustaining our political and cultural heritage’ with a fundamental role in maintaining the
fabric of society.”) (internal citation omitted).
244. See supra notes 12–17 and accompanying text; see also Seth Grossman, Comment, Grand
Theft Oreo: The Constitutionality of Advergame Regulation, 115 YALE L.J. 227, 234 (2005) (arguing
that regulations of snack food “advergames” should pass the third prong of Central Hudson so long as
the government “carefully and thoroughly compiles such evidence of the link between advergames and
the health of children”).
245. Compare Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 344 (1986) (holding
that under Central Hudson it was “up to the legislature” to choose to reduce gambling by suppressing
in-state casino advertising instead of some less speech-restrictive policy), with 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 509 (1996) (“Given our longstanding hostility to commercial speech
regulation of this type, Posadas clearly erred in concluding that it was ‘up to the legislature’ to choose
suppression over a less speech-restrictive policy.”). See also Metromedia Inc v. San Diego, 453 U.S.
490, 507–14 (1981) (plurality opinion) (finding that total ban on outdoor advertising passed all prongs
of Central Hudson, even though it failed on other First Amendment grounds); 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S.
at 508 (citing Metromedia for the proposition that “[o]ur commercial speech cases recognize some
room for the exercise of legislative judgment.”).
246. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 516.
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Although courts have not explicitly acknowledged any such connection between
the second and fourth prongs of Central Hudson, a close reading of commercial
speech cases suggests that it might exist. To take just one example, in the
pre-Central Hudson case of Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,247 the
Supreme Court upheld a broad prophylactic ban on lawyers’ in-person solicita-
tion of clients based in part on the importance of the governmental interest in
preventing solicitees’ duress.248 If anything, Central Hudson seems to have
strengthened this “weighing” approach. Indeed, in San Francisco Arts & Athlet-
ics v. United States Olympic Commission,249 the Court specifically noted that
both the Central Hudson test and “the test for a time, place or manner restriction
under O’Brien require a balance between the governmental interest and the
magnitude of the speech restriction.”250
C. SCHOOL NAMING RIGHTS AS SCHOOLHOUSE SPEECH: FORUM-BASED CLASSIFICATION
The previous two sections have considered naming rights as government
speech and as commercial speech. There is, however, at least one more possibil-
ity: That naming rights constitute noncommercial speech on the part of the
sponsors. Indeed, many sponsors and schools insist that naming rights arrange-
ments are simply charitable donations accompanied by an expression of grati-
tude, an essentially noncommercial act. Such speech is generally entitled to the
full protections of the First Amendment, with certain very limited exceptions.251
However, even this “pure” speech can be validly regulated based upon the
“forum” where it is made. In the case of school naming rights, which take place
in the unique forum of public schools, that analysis can be deceptively compli-
cated. When considered alongside the commercial speech and government
speech approaches described above, it becomes even more so, because forum
analysis begins by focusing on the location of a speech act, rather than on the
speaker or the content involved.
1. Defining the Forum
The acceptability of a government regulation on “pure” speech depends on
247. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
248. Id. at 468; see also Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995) (upholding Florida
bar association’s prohibition on lawyers sending written solicitations to prospective personal injury
clients within thirty days of an accident). But see In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 431, 434 (1978) (finding
that an ACLU lawyer’s letter to a group of indigent political clients falls within the “generous zone of
First Amendment protections reserved for associational freedoms” and that “[w]here political expres-
sion or association is at issue, this Court has not tolerated the degree of imprecision that often
characterized government regulation of the conduct of commercial affairs.”).
249. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
250. Id. at 537 n.16 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
251. These exceptions include obscenity, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973), and “fighting
words,” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), neither of which are likely to be
implicated by naming rights arrangements.
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the characterization of the “forum”252 where the speech is made.253 The First
Amendment recognizes three such forums—the public forum, the nonpublic
forum, and the limited public forum. Although most schools and school-related
forums fall into the latter category, there are no clear definitional lines between
the forums themselves.254 This lack of a boundary makes it difficult to predict
how courts will characterize the “forum” created by naming rights arrange-
ments,255 but it is clear that their determination will turn on a fact-intensive
review of the particular policy or decision at issue.256
Traditional public forums include areas such as public parks and streets
“which the state has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive
activity.”257 Regulations of speech in such forums are subject to strict scrutiny,
and the only acceptable restrictions are those on time, place, and manner, or
those based on content-based restrictions which are narrowly drawn to serve a
compelling state interest.258 Fortunately for school boards, naming rights poli-
252. For the purposes of forum analysis, “place” includes not just physical property but even
channels of communications such as an intraschool mail system. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983); see also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitor of the Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) (“The SAF is a forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or
geographic sense, but the same principles are applicable.” (internal citations omitted)); Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1985) (treating charitable contribution fund
as property for purposes of forum analysis). The forum created by school naming rights deals thus
includes not just the walls of a school, but the “name” of the school in a more metaphysical sense.
253. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (describing forum analysis).
254. Lefstin, supra note 216, at 706 (“The line between ‘general access’ designated public fora and
‘selective access’ nonpublic fora may be difficult to discern . . . .”).
255. Compare Texas v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 58 F.3d 1075, 1078 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding
that a state Adopt-A-Highway program did not create a public forum), with Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d
702, 706 (8th Cir. 2000) (declining to reach forum analysis, but holding that “[w]hether this claim
arises under the Equal Protection Clause or the First Amendment, it is clear that the State may not deny
access to the Adopt-A-Highway program based on the applicant’s views.”). See also Jacobs, supra note
119, at 90–91 (criticizing the use of forum analysis in Adopt-A-Highway cases and arguing that a
government speech characterization would be more appropriate); Suzanne Stone Montgomery, Note,
When the Klan Adopts-A-Highway: The Weaknesses of the Public Forum Doctrine Exposed, 77 Wash.
U. L.Q. 557, 558 (1999) (“[F]our different federal courts, confronted with three substantially similar
programs, approached the public forum doctrine in five different ways.”) (internal citations omitted).
256. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809.
257. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
258. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269–70 (1981); see also Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) (upholding reasonable restrictions on the distribution of
religious literature and solicitation in an airport terminal, which is not a traditional public forum);
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 805–13 (holding that Combined Federal Campaign created a nonpublic forum in
which restrictions must be reasonable, and that refusal to allow certain advocacy groups to participate
in that forum did not abridge their First Amendment rights); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 297–98 (1984) (upholding prohibition on sleep-in demonstration in a park that did not
generally allow overnight camping); Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (striking down
ordinance which prohibited labor-related picketing outside of a high school); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 536, 558 (1965) (overturning civil rights activist’s convictions for disturbing the peace, obstructing
a public passage, and picketing outside a courthouse); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 274, 284
(1951) (reversing disorderly conduct convictions where petitioner was convicted for having spoken
about religion in a public park without a permit but the permit-granting process was entirely discretion-
ary).
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cies are unlikely to create public forums, although it is possible that an “open”
public naming rights policy—one which accepts all sponsors with no mecha-
nism for oversight and no regulations—might do so. A school board that in
practice failed to exercise control over its sponsors might also inadvertently
create a public forum.259 Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized
that the way in which a forum is used in turn shapes the amount of free speech
regulation allowed there.260 Schools and other government entities that throw
open their doors to sponsors—either in practice or by the terms of their
policies—risk finding themselves the managers of a public forum, and thus with
little power to pick and choose between sponsors.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, the government has broad discretion to
regulate speech in nonpublic forums such as military bases261 and the sidewalks
outside post offices.262 Regulations on speech in such nonpublic forums are
acceptable so long as they are “reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum and are viewpoint neutral.”263 In other words, the First Amendment does
not prohibit the viewpoint neutral exclusion of speakers who would hinder the
purpose of the nonpublic forum.264 A naming rights policy might create a
nonpublic forum if it did not manifest any intent to create a means of expressive
activity for the sponsors.265
2. Schools as Limited Forums
Although it is possible that naming rights policies would be classified as
259. See supra notes 83–102 and sources cited therein.
260. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487–88 (1988) (applying narrow reading and
upholding ordinance prohibiting picketing “before or about” any residence or dwelling); Grayned v.
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 121 (1972) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting disruptive noisemaking
adjacent to school); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (finding that students
have a First Amendment right to wear black armbands as protest, unless it results in disruption in the
school); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (holding that a silent vigil in a public library is
protected, while a noisy and disruptive demonstration might not be).
261. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976).
262. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990) (suggesting existence of nonpublic forum,
but ultimately resolving case on other grounds).
263. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806; see also Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460
U.S. 37, 49 (1983) (“The touchstone for evaluating these distinctions is whether they are reasonable in
light of the purpose which the forum at issue serves.”).
264. This fact of course raises the possibility that government actors might try to justify as
“viewpoint-neutral” an otherwise invalid viewpoint-based restriction by pointing instead to the disrup-
tive reaction caused by the expression of that viewpoint. A school board, for example, might reject a
controversial sponsor based on the disruption that opposition to the sponsor would create. In the words
of one court, though, “the First Amendment knows no heckler’s veto.” Robb v. Hungerbeeler, 370 F.3d
735, 743 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lewis v. Wilson, 253 F.3d 1077, 1081–82 (8th Cir. 2001)) (holding
that possible dangerous public reaction is insufficient rationale to bar the Ku Klux Klan from the
Adopt-A-Highway program); see also Brown, 383 U.S. at 133 n.1.
265. See DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 968–69 (9th Cir. 1999)
(inferring and upholding existence of a “commercial only” policy that created a nonpublic forum where
school had only ever accepted commercial advertisements and later refused to post the Ten Command-
ments); Dolan, supra note 79, at 126 (“In choosing sponsors and partners, government does not intend
to open a forum for private speech, but rather to obtain assistance to leverage its own ability to act.”).
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either public or nonpublic forums, public schools themselves are generally
regarded as a unique kind of “limited” forum,266 and it is likely that their
naming rights policies will be similarly categorized. Courts have not settled on a
particular definition of a “limited forum,”267 but such a forum is generally
thought to exist where the government opens its property for expressive activity
and intends268 to make it “generally available” to a class of speakers.269 The
intent requirement is important,270 and demonstrates the legal relevance of the
motivations and concerns discussed in Part II of this Article.271 In any case,
once a limited forum has been opened, its lawful boundaries must be re-
spected,272 and a form of modified strict scrutiny governs regulations of speech
within it. Restrictions based on subject matter and speaker identity are accept-
able,273 but must nonetheless be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant
266. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeir, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988).
267. See generally Ronnie J. Fischer, “What’s in a Name?”: An Attempt To Resolve the “Analytic
Ambiguity” of the Designated and Limited Public Fora, 107 DICK. L. REV. 639 (2003).
268. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (“The government does not create a public forum by inaction or by
permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public
discourse.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990) (“We have held that
‘the government does not create a public forum by . . . permitting limited discourse, but only by
intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.’ Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (empha-
sis added).”). But see Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee 505 U.S. 672, 697–700
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (objecting to the majority’s focus on government intent, and arguing that
forum status should be based on objective physical characteristics of the property).
269. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264 (1981).
270. See, e.g., Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730. This focus on intent in
identifying limited forums contrasts with the public forum analysis described above, which focused
instead on the actual control exercised by the government. See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v.
Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998) (“[T]raditional public fora are open for expressive activity regardless
of the government’s intent.”); Planned Parenthood of Southern Nev., Inc. v. Clark County Sch. Dist.,
941 F.2d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Hazelwood teaches that school facilities may be deemed to be
public forums only if school authorities have ‘by policy or by practice’ opened those facilities ‘for
indiscriminate use by the general public,’ or by some segment of the public, such as student organiza-
tions.” (internal citations omitted)); Planned Parenthood Ass’n/Chicago Area v. Chicago Transit Auth.,
767 F.2d 1225, 1232 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that “the CTA advertising system has become a public
forum” because “CTA maintains no system of control over the advertisements it accepts for posting on
its system other than the general contractual directive to Winston to refuse vulgar, immoral, or
disreputable advertising. Access to CTA’s advertising system, then, is virtually guaranteed to anyone
willing to pay the fee.”).
271. Although I do not pursue the argument here, the focus on government intent in creating
particular forums may be roughly analogous to the government speech inquiry’s focus on identifying
the government’s underlying voice.
272. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). There is
obviously something of a bootstrapping issue here in that the classification of the forum, which in turn
determines the acceptability of restrictions on speech, is defined in part by the existence of prior
restrictions on speech in the forum. Though somewhat confusing, this is less troubling when one
considers that the existence of an ex ante policy regulating speech generally gives a baseline by which
to judge whether any new regulation or limitation is targeted at a particular speaker or message.
273. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Educators’Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983).
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government interest while leaving open ample alternatives.”274
Schools and school-related activities have traditionally been treated as uniquely
limited forums.275 Indeed, the Court has specifically recognized in its leading
schoolhouse free speech cases that First Amendment claims must be considered
“in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.”276 School
administrators are thus given some constrained discretion to regulate speech in
school. The Supreme Court sketched the contours of that discretion in Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District,277 Bethel School District
No. 403 v. Fraser,278 and Hazelwood School District v. Kulhmeier.279 In Tinker,
the Court famously ruled that “[n]either students [n]or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate,”280 and that the fear of possible disturbance caused by students’ anti-war
armbands was by itself insufficient to constitutionally justify a school’s view-
point discrimination in prohibiting the armbands.281 The implicit acknowledge-
ment that the First Amendment rights of students in public schools “are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings” was
confirmed in Fraser, which held that a school need not tolerate student speech
that interferes with its “basic educational mission.”282 Specifically, the Court
held in Fraser that a student could be subject to discipline for delivering a
“sexually explicit” speech at a school assembly, because the school was entitled
to “disassociate itself” from the speech in order to demonstrate that its sexually
explicit content was “wholly inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of
public school education.”283 Two years later, Hazelwood elaborated and clari-
fied Tinker and Fraser. In Hazelwood, a high school principal removed two
controversial articles from the school newspaper on the grounds that the stu-
dents who wrote them had not mastered certain requirements of the journalism
curriculum, and that the articles would threaten both the privacy of other
274. Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 562 (E.D.Va 1998)
(enjoining, on First Amendment grounds, board of library trustees from enforcing policy on Internet
sexual harassment that prohibited access to certain content-based categories of Internet publications).
275. Whether schoolhouse speech represents a different category of speech entirely is an interesting
possibility, but one which I set aside in an attempt to keep this already complicated topic within
reasonable bounds. Even Rosenberger essentially became a forum analysis case after the Court found
no government speech. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch. Dist., 533 U.S. 98, 112 (2001)
(“[W]e reaffirm our holdings in Lamb’s Chapel and Rosenberger that speech discussing otherwise
permissible subjects cannot be excluded from a limited public forum on the ground that the subject is
discussed from a religious viewpoint.”).
276. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeir, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
277. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
278. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
279. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
280. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
281. Id. at 509.
282. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
283. Id. at 685–86.
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students and the legal, moral, and ethical obligations of the writers.284 The
Court found that “we cannot reject as unreasonable Principal Reynolds’ conclu-
sion that neither the pregnancy article nor the divorce article was suitable for
publication” and therefore held that “no violation of First Amendment rights
occurred.”285 Hazelwood may thus cast some light on the regulation of naming
rights, by holding that materials to which students might be exposed can be
regulated in some circumstances, especially for curricular purposes.286 The
case’s reach extends beyond school newspapers, to include other means of
expression which bear the “imprimatur” of the school.287
This past June, the Supreme Court handed down its fourth major school
speech decision, Morse v. Frederick,288 which revisited and endorsed the lim-
ited forum analysis of Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood. In Morse, a splintered
Court ruled that a high school principal did not run afoul of the First Amend-
ment by confiscating a banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” and disciplining
a student who refused to take it down himself.289 The actual holding of the case
was quite narrow. Invoking the importance of student safety, it upheld schools’
power to limit speech that reasonably appears to encourage illegal drug use, as
opposed to advocating decriminalization, or opposing the war on drugs, or any
other social or political commentary.290 The Court’s decision did not appear to
rest clearly on any of its previous three school speech cases, but it did confirm
that schools are a uniquely limited kind of limited public forum.
Even though the Court’s schoolhouse speech cases give the government some
power to regulate speech in schools, such regulations are not immune from
attack. In Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,291 the
Supreme Court found that after-school use of school property created a limited
forum,292 and that banning all religious activities from that forum constituted
viewpoint discrimination293 rather than the kind of subject matter regulations
that are acceptable in a limited forum. Applied to the context of naming rights,
284. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeir, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 261. This point regarding curriculum obviously raises a parallel with the earlier discus-
sion of naming rights as curricula, supra notes 147–148 and accompanying text, which cast their
curricular value as indicative of government speech. Nevertheless, Bezanson and Buss note that
Hazelwood “did not rest on a clearly defined idea of government speech” but rather “on doctrines
premised on government’s role as regulator.” Bezanson & Buss, supra note 5, at 1418.
287. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
288. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
289. Id. at 2622.
290. Id. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring) (“I join the opinion of the Court on the understanding that (a)
it goes no further than to hold that a public school may restrict speech that a reasonable observer would
interpret as advocating illegal drug use and (b) it provides no support for any restriction of speech that
can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue, including speech on issues
such as the wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing marijuana for medicinal use.”) (quotation
marks and internal citation omitted).
291. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
292. Id. at 390–93.
293. Id. at 394.
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Lamb’s Chapel obviously raises the question of whether school boards, having
opened a limited forum by accepting some naming rights deals, could legiti-
mately reject all religious (or undesirable for other reasons) sponsors without
running afoul of the First Amendment.294 There is no clear answer to that
question. It seems reasonable to assume that Lamb’s Chapel was based in part
on the Court’s solicitousness of religious freedom, since in Metromedia (a
commercial speech case) the Court upheld a complete ban on all outdoor
commercial billboard advertising in San Diego.295 The fact that schools—which
are certainly more “limited” forums than the city of San Diego—cannot ban
religious groups from their facilities is most easily explained by reference to the
content of the speech involved in both cases.
As Lamb’s Chapel and the discussion of commercial speech in the following
subsection illustrate, attempts to apply limited public forum analysis to naming
rights arrangements can be further complicated by the kind of speech such
naming rights are thought to constitute. The logic of Lamb’s Chapel suggests
that religious sponsors represent a “viewpoint” rather than a “subject matter”
and thus that regulations on their speech are bound to fail.296 But even holding
that issue aside for the moment, unresolved wrinkles in the doctrine complicate
any attempts to assess naming rights arrangements as limited forums. A closer
reading of Hazelwood’s intent-based forum analysis in fact suggests that the
Court’s approval of the school’s restrictions was based specifically on its
concern for the school’s curricular “forum,” not the separate noncurricular
forum created by advertising in a school newspaper.297 This suggests that
294. This Article does not address the related, interesting, and potentially mind-bending questions
raised by churches and other religious organizations’ participation in naming rights deals. Some
churches have already engaged in such deals as sellers. See Naming Rights Are Up for Bid on
Monastery, DESERET-MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake City, UT), Aug. 2, 2003, at E02 (reporting that a group
of Benedictine monks planned to auction off naming rights to a church building, monastery, and bell
towers, and that “[i]f marketing the buildings is a success, future auctions will sell naming rights to
choir books, stained glass windows and church pews”). Given that religious organizations already often
use schools as meeting places—thus giving rise to the issues addressed in Lamb’s Chapel—it is
possible that a wealthy religious group might seek to sponsor a classroom or other school facility. Such
a case would implicate various other provisions in the First Amendment, which have already been
addressed to some degree by the Court in similar contexts. See, e.g., Pinette v. Capitol Square Review
and Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (holding that the Establishment Clause does not justify the
government’s refusal to allow public display of a cross by a private group in a public park pursuant to
an equal access policy); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
(invalidating on Free Speech and Free Press grounds an attempt by the University of Virginia to limit
the amount of school funds given to student publications based on religious viewpoint).
295. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
296. Of course, it is possible that the apparently content neutral policy in Lamb’s Chapel was in fact
simply a front for viewpoint discrimination against particular religious speakers. And as noted earlier,
the Court will not countenance regulations that are a fac¸ade for viewpoint discrimination. See Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 812–13 (1985) (suggesting that on remand,
respondents could pursue a determination of whether the challenged regulations were a pretext for
viewpoint discrimination).
297. See, e.g., Recent Case, Planned Parenthood of Southern Nevada, Inc. v. Clark County School
District, 105 HARV. L. REV. 597, 602 (1991).
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schools have more regulatory authority over naming rights deals when those
deals have some kind of curricular value. And as discussed above, some school
board naming policies specifically acknowledge the educational function of a
school’s name.298 But as the commercial speech discussion and the concerns
raised in Part II of this Article illustrate, sponsors may indeed have advertising
in mind when they enter into naming rights arrangements. Somewhat counter-
intuitively then, the degree to which a court finds that a named sponsor is
motivated by advertising and profit may correspondingly limit a school’s power
to regulate that sponsor’s message in a limited forum. Of course, as with
government speech, sponsors who play up their own economic motives in order
to avoid the government speech or schoolhouse speech label may unwittingly
find themselves classified as commercial speakers, stripped of full First Amend-
ment protection. Sponsors trying to avoid one undesirable area of First Amend-
ment law—government speech—may thus end up arguing their way into yet
another—commercial speech. The following subsection explores in more detail
the ramifications of this overlap.
3. Layering the Problem: The Intersection of Government Speech, Commercial
Speech, and Schoolhouse Speech
The analysis up until this point has tried to sketch out the boundaries between
the doctrines of commercial speech, government speech, and schoolhouse
speech, noting along the way that these borders are porous, hard to identify, and
sometimes disputed. This final subsection attempts to shed light on what
happens in the territory claimed by all three categories. The discussion also tries
to show that resolving the disputes between the categories might be impossible
under current doctrine, because they begin with fundamentally different inquir-
ies that yield non-exclusive answers.
The interaction between government speech and commercial speech is illustra-
tive. As described in more detail above, commercial speech receives an entirely
different standard of protection than “pure” speech, while government speech is
treated like a categorical exception to the First Amendment. Courts have
generally treated commercial and government speech as exclusive categories,299
but public school naming rights arrangements make it hard to maintain that
distinction. Courts might classify school naming rights as government speech,
as commercial speech, or—perhaps most intriguing of all—acknowledge the
overlap between the two categories and attempt to reconcile the definitions and
standards that govern them.
As described above, the standard First Amendment prohibition on viewpoint
298. See supra notes 147–148 and accompanying text.
299. See, e.g., Goetz v. Glickman, 149 F.3d 1131, 1138 (10th Cir. 1998) (agreeing with the Secretary
of the Department of Agriculture that an assessment required by the Beef Promotion Act “is ‘govern-
ment speech’ (as opposed to commercial speech) and there are no First Amendment restrictions on
‘government speech’”).
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discrimination does not apply to government speech. But commercial speech
doctrine does prohibit viewpoint discrimination, allowing regulations only to
the degree that they directly advance a substantial government interest and are
no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.300 In cases of “commer-
cial” government speech, where both standards are simultaneously implicated,
which would control? It is certainly plausible that commercial speech remains
just that, even if the government is the speaker. But on the other hand, the Court
has suggested that “commercial” speech by a religiously affiliated speaker is
entitled to some heightened level of protection.301 Indeed, the core of govern-
ment speech doctrine—that the relevant question is whose message is being
delivered, not who delivers it—seems to support the commercial-religious
analogy. Approaching the question from the perspective of government speech
only confirms this result. For while Rust and its progeny demonstrate that
private actors can deliver government speech, they also seem to imply the
corollary: If the focus is on the message, not the messenger, then just as
non-government actors are not precluded from delivering government speech,
the government is not necessarily limited to it. The sponsorship scenario thus
opens up the possibility of the government delivering a private party’s commer-
cial message. The growing prevalence of sponsorship deals and other public-
private partnerships has made this possibility increasingly hard to ignore. What
remains unclear, however, is which standard—government speech or commer-
cial speech—should govern. If both standards were applied simultaneously, it
seems clear that the government speech standard would trump the more speech-
protective commercial speech standard,302 thus giving the government the same
broad power to control government-commercial speech as it has over all other
government speech. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that the government would
be more limited when engaged in government speech with commercial content
than it would be when making government speech with political content, such
as the speech involved in Rust.
One of the implicit difficulties in this government-commercial analysis is that
government speech analysis focuses on the speaker behind the message, whereas
commercial speech analysis employs a multi-factored approach that essentially
considers the content of the message. These are separate questions, and may
300. See supra subsection III.B.1.
301. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court found that Jehovah’s Witnesses’ door-to-door
proselytizing and distribution of literature—some of which was available for purchase—was religious
speech rather than commercial speech. 319 U.S. 105, 108–11 (1943). This was a crucial holding for the
Jehovah’s Witnesses, since commercial speech received no protection whatsoever at the time. The
opinion noted that not all religious activity is protected by the First Amendment, id. at 109–10, but that
distribution of religious literature for purchase was no more a “commercial” venture than passing the
collection plate in church. Id. at 111; see also Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 414–18 (1943); Largent
v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418, 422 (1943).
302. Compare supra notes 217–233 and accompanying text (describing the commercial speech
standard), with supra notes 105–123 and accompanying text (describing the government speech
standard).
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result in overlapping answers: Speech can simultaneously meet both tests, thus
qualifying for two different kinds of protection. The preceding discussion
suggested how a court might resolve the overlapping standards of these catego-
ries. It did not, however, suggest how courts can resolve the definitional overlap
between the two. In many ways that is an even thornier question. If courts were
to borrow the speaker-based approach they use to differentiate between govern-
mental and nongovernmental speech, they would likely find the vast majority of
public school naming rights deals to be commercial speech, since the private
speakers involved are usually corporations attempting to profit from the arrange-
ment. One might find support for this view, ironically enough, in the school
boards’ own statements. The discussion in section III.A suggested that school
boards might reject “bad” sponsors so that they themselves can avoid sending a
bad message. But schools’ opposition to certain naming rights deals, like public
opposition to schoolhouse commercialism, seems to be primarily driven by a
desire to avoid exposing students to a bad message. When posed that way, the
motivation for naming rights regulations seems to implicitly recognize that the
school itself is not the speaker, but instead is trying to limit the speech of a
private speaker, such as an advertiser pushing unhealthy snacks or a sponsor
with a controversial message. Though the difference may seem subtle, it makes
all the difference for First Amendment analysis, because it acknowledges that
the government is not trying to watch its own mouth, but rather monitor
someone else’s.
The overlap between government speech and commercial speech is all the
more interesting because so many of the recent cases addressing “government
speech” actually involve messages that appear to be commercial on their face.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Johanns—which upheld a federal statute that
requires beef producers to pay an assessment which is in turn used to fund
generic beef advertising303—exemplifies the trend. In Johanns, the Court was
confronted with a form of speech (advertisements) that appeared on its face to
be the kind of obviously commercial speech that would fall even within Justice
Blackmun’s limited Virginia Pharmacy definition of commercial speech. The
Court nevertheless found that the beef advertisements were government speech,
and that the government could be held accountable for that speech by the ballot,
but not by the First Amendment. The Court’s opinion seems to signal that
speaker identity (at least when the speaker is the government) trumps speech
content (at least when the content is commercial).304
Whatever the resolution of this border dispute between government speech
and commercial speech, courts will still be left facing thorny problems concern-
ing how the forum analysis associated with schoolhouse speech interacts with
303. Johanns v. Livestock Mkt. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 567 (2005).
304. For an argument that government speech doctrine should be rendered inapplicable to such
commercial speech, see Daniel A. Dvorak, Note, Forced Commercial Speech and the Government
Speech Doctrine: Discerning and Reducing the Uncertainty Following Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
Association, 32 J. CORP. L. 429, 442–43 (2007).
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both commercial speech and government speech.305 Some of these interactions
are likely to be more problematic than others. In a nonpublic forum, it is
probably irrelevant whether or not speech is classified as commercial, since the
government’s broad regulatory authority in a nonpublic forum would seem to
encompass both commercial and noncommercial speech. In a nonpublic forum,
regulations on speech—even pure political speech—are governed by a kind of
rational basis review and are acceptable so long as they are viewpoint neutral
and reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.306 Restrictions on
commercial speech, by contrast, are subject to a stricter scrutiny under which
they are constitutional only to the degree that they directly advance a substantial
government interest and are no more extensive than necessary to serve the
stated interest.307 Holding aside the characterization of the forum, this standard
seems to preserve some level of protection for commercial speech. But the
commercial speech test has only been tested in public forums, where no stricter
forum-based test governs. In a nonpublic forum, where even pure political
speech is susceptible to broad government regulation, the commercial speech
standard is unlikely to trump the basic nonpublic forum test.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, if a court finds that a naming rights
policy creates a public forum, the government will be stripped of nearly any
power to regulate the speech and speakers within it. In such a case, the
government (the school board, that is) would be well-served to characterize the
“speech” at issue as commercial. If successful, such a characterization would at
least allow regulation of speech under the modified strict scrutiny standard
contemplated in Central Hudson. Rather than being limited to strictly scruti-
nized, content-neutral restrictions,308 schools could regulate naming rights to
the degree that their regulations directly advanced a substantial government
interest and were no more extensive than necessary to serve the stated inter-
est.309 School administrators seeking to limit naming rights arrangements could
thus reclaim some of the regulatory authority they would otherwise forego
under public forum analysis, so long as they demonstrated that the regulations at
issue advanced the substantial government interest in education and were not
overly extensive for that purpose.310
305. See also Ayers, supra note 102, at 623–24 (criticizing the Court for failing to resolve apparent
conflict between forum analysis and commercial speech doctrine in the context of public transit ads);
id. at 627–37 (exploring the “ongoing muddle of public forum doctrine and commercial/noncommercial
speech distinctions”); Bezanson & Buss, supra note 5, at 1428–32 (criticizing the Court’s attempts to
draw a boundary between public forum analysis and government speech); Stern, supra note 178, at
113–15 (discussing the emergence of subsections within commercial speech law).
306. See supra notes 263–65 and accompanying text (describing the standard governing speech in a
nonpublic forum).
307. See supra notes 214–22 and accompanying text (describing the Central Hudson test).
308. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
309. This is, of course, the Central Hudson test. See supra notes 214–22 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 243–50 and accompanying text (applying Central Hudson test to public school
naming rights).
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Some courts have noted the similarities between the constitutional tests for
restrictions on commercial speech and content-neutral time, place, and manner
restrictions.311 But on closer examination, commercial speech and public forum
analysis are very uneasy bedfellows.312 In a public forum, the government is
prohibited from making “content-based” restrictions.313 But in the context of
commercial speech, literally every regulation is content-based. Indeed, the
entire category is defined based on its commercial content (at least to the degree
that it is defined at all).314 This potential complication may simply be a matter
of semantics, at least for those who would argue that the whole point of
commercial speech doctrine is to carve out an exception to the “content-neutral”
requirement generally applicable to free speech regulations. And as one commen-
tator has noted, “[t]he only consistently successful method of excluding divisive
public speech from a limited public forum has been ‘commercial only’ poli-
cies.”315 This suggests that courts themselves are comfortable with policies that
exclude speech from certain forums based on its content. Even so, it highlights a
tension between pure speech, which is not regulable based on content, and
commercial speech, which is defined by and regulable precisely because of its
content.
One of the most interesting interactions—one that will become increasingly
important as government sponsorship deals proliferate—occurs where the stan-
dards governing regulations of commercial speech meet those governing regula-
tions in “limited” public forums. Both allow for some regulation of speech,
subject to a modified form of strict scrutiny. And in the particular context
addressed by this Article—the regulation of school naming rights arrange-
ments—it seems very likely that in any given situation both standards might
simultaneously be applicable.316 This would give the government the power to
implement regulations for the limited forums which are “narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest” and which discriminate with regard to
311. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (noting that the tests are
“substantially similar”) (internal citation omitted); Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1995)
(describing the tests as “essentially identical”).
312. Note, supra note 234, at 2838 (“[A]lthough commercial speech and expressive conduct are
both hybrid speech evaluated under similar four-part intermediate scrutiny tests, the actual levels of
review applied to restrictions on these types of speech have diverged in recent years, with protection for
commercial speech moving toward strict scrutiny and protection for expressive conduct drifting toward
rational basis review.”).
313. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 196–213 (describing lack of a workable definition of commercial speech).
315. Dolan, supra note 79, at 73; see also Children of the Rosary v. Phoenix, 154 F.3d 972, 976–78
(9th Cir. 1998) (categorizing city bus ad spaces as a nonpublic forum based on the city’s prohibition of
noncommercial advertising); Ayers, supra note 102, at 627.
316. Indeed, some courts have noted the issue of commercial speech in public school forums. In
Dawson v. East Side Union High School District, the California Court of Appeals found that the
commercial and political messages of Channel One (a television program broadcast in some public
schools) were not “inextricably intertwined” and that the state could constitutionally regulate them
differently. 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 108, 118–19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). The case did not, however, note the
connection between forum analysis and commercial speech doctrine.
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subject matter but not content or viewpoint (the limited forum standard), and
also the power to regulate commercial speech to the degree that such regula-
tions would directly advance a substantial government interest and are no more
extensive than necessary to serve the stated interest (the commercial speech
standard).
On their faces, it is unclear which of these two standards is more accommodat-
ing. The commercial speech test may give the government increased leeway,
since it requires only a “substantial” (rather than “significant”) government
interest. But in the context of school naming rights, it seems unlikely that the
importance of the governmental interest is the hurdle on which any regulation
would fall—a school board would presumably assert that education is its
interest, and education has been recognized as one of the most important
governmental interests of all.317 It is certainly both “substantial” and “signifi-
cant.” Thus, the real difference may turn on the narrowness of the regulations
allowable under the commercial speech and limited public forum analyses,
respectively. The commercial speech test seems more restrictive, since it allows
only regulations that “are no more extensive than necessary to serve the stated
interest,” rather than the perhaps more accommodating “narrowly tailored”
regulations available in the limited public forum. However, as Fox and other
cases have explicitly stated, the fourth prong of Central Hudson—requiring
regulations to be “no more extensive than necessary”—demands only a “fit that
is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable” between the “ends and the means.”318
Thus it seems that the commercial speech standard might actually give school
boards more leeway than the limited public forum standard in regulating
naming rights arrangements. In the (likely) event that a court finds both
standards applicable, it could thus decide the case based solely on commercial
speech. Put another way, even if a school naming rights policy creates a public
forum, if the speech in that forum is commercial it will be entitled to even less
protection than “pure” speech in a limited forum.
Finally, there are also complicated overlaps between government speech and
forum analysis.319 And again, the categories’ definitions seem to collapse on
each other while nevertheless pointing to different legal conclusions. In the
government speech cases, the government may regulate speakers that it has
chosen to deliver its message.320 In a limited forum, however, the government
317. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (describing education as having a “pivotal” and
“fundamental” role).
318. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y., 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (emphasis added) (finding that a
university’s rule prohibiting commercial enterprises from operating in campus facilities was not a per se
violation of Central Hudson); see also Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 633 (1995) (holding
that a regulation barring solicitation to prospective personal injury clients is not overbroad simply
because it fails to distinguish between degrees of injury); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525,
556 (2001) (citing Florida Bar and striking down state restriction on tobacco advertising).
319. Dolan, supra note 79, at 72 (“The limited public forum test and the government speech
approaches are on a collision course.”).
320. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
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may not regulate speakers based on the fact that they espouse views with which
the government disagrees. Conceptually, this is a slippery distinction. Essen-
tially it means that the government can regulate private speakers so long as it
agrees with them enough that it can claim they are actually delivering the
government’s own message, but it cannot control those with whom it dis-
agrees.321 The broader the government’s message, then, the more private mouth-
pieces it supposedly speaks through, and the broader the government’s power to
regulate them.322 But perhaps, as Bezanson suggests, government subsidy for
speech “is not enough to transform private speech into government speech,
controllable by government as to content,” especially where those content
controls are unrelated to “government’s valid expressive purposes.”323
Of all the overlapping categories discussed in this Article, this overlap
between government speech and forum analysis has received the most attention
from scholars324 and even some courts.325 Generally it has arisen in the context
321. An interesting question, not addressed here, is how a publicly subsidized private speaker can
disclaim his role as a government mouthpiece. For example, a sponsor might enter into a naming rights
deal, only to find the deal classified as government speech by a court. The sponsor, fearing the loss of
control that comes with this classification, may want to “reclaim” its voice. It is unclear, in the naming
rights context, how it could do so.
On this point it is worth noting that at least three Justices have acknowledged the possibility of
government disclaimers in determining government endorsement. Capital Square Review & Advisory
Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 782 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 793–94 (Souter, J.,
concurring); id. at 818 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
322. Note, supra note 105, at 2412 (“The unsettling potential result of this doctrinal framework is
that, with few obvious limitations, the government could essentially buy out large amounts of private
speech simply by funding private enterprises.”).
323. Bezanson, supra note 161, at 993–94.
324. See, e.g., Bezanson, supra note 161 at 954 (“If speech selection is itself a form of protected
expression under the First Amendment, is it equally so when the government is the selector? The
answer, it turns out, might just be ‘Yes.’”); Dolan, supra note 79, at 73 (discussing “special public
purpose forums” which consist of “projects or programs where government has a subjective expressive
purpose that includes particular values and is carried out through selection of private speakers”).
Others have described variants on this how-much-does-the-government-agree argument. Cass Sun-
stein, for example, suggests that government speech is less constitutionally problematic where it
advances a widely shared, nonpartisan goal such as celebrating democracy. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOC-
RACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 229–32 (1993). Responding directly to Sunstein, Abner Greene
has explored the ramifications of Sunstein’s argument and the distinction between “the settled and the
unsettled” in government speech and other areas of law. See Abner S. Greene, Government Speech on
Unsettled Issues, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1667 (2001).
Courts have acknowledged—though not fully explained—this distinction in government speech
cases. Concurring with the denial of rehearing en banc in Planned Parenthood of South Carolina, Judge
Wilkinson noted:
This is a presidential election year. May a state issue plates touting one candidate, but not
another? It is one thing for states to use license plates to celebrate birds and butterflies,
military service, historical events and scenic vistas. It is quite another for the state to privilege
private speech on one side—and one side only—of a fundamental moral, religious, or political
controversy.
Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc v. Rose, 373 F.3d 580, 581 (4th Cir. 2004) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in
denial of rehearing). The Sixth Circuit answered these questions, though without referring directly to
Judge Wilkinson’s opinion: “Of course the unstated distinction is that the ‘Choose Life’ message is
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of “speech selection” cases such as Arkansas Educational Television Commis-
sion v. Forbes326 and National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,327 both of
which involved the government’s power to “speak” by choosing which private
speakers are allowed to voice their opinions in a particular forum. By blessing
the government’s ability to act as an “editor” allowing or rejecting certain
political candidates or artists from participating in government-supported pro-
grams, Forbes and Finley implicitly expanded the role of the government as a
“speaker” at the expense of the government’s role as a regulator of speech. In
fact, under the editing-as-speaking approach taken in Forbes and Finley, the
government may “speak” through private mouthpieces even when it does not
agree with each of the private speakers it selects, so long as it selects and
presents an array of viewpoints that, taken together, advance the government’s
viewpoint.328 Because the government is greatly circumscribed when acting as a
regulator, and has great discretion when acting as a speaker, the shift is subtle as
a matter of description but massive as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
This Article is intended not as a roadmap—the terrain it describes is for the
most part still unexplored—but rather as a compass for scholars, school boards,
sponsors, and courts faced with the difficult but inevitable task of orienting
themselves in this uncharted area of constitutional law. Although the discussion
here has addressed future cases brought by hypothetical sponsors challenging
yet-nonexistent school board decisions, it has also illuminated a series of very
real concerns with the coherence of current First Amendment doctrine. As Parts
I and II describe, the sale of naming rights to public school facilities is growing
increasingly popular and increasingly controversial. And as Part III indicates,
that trend directly implicates some of the most problematic and volatile catego-
ries of free speech. The coming wave of school naming rights cases, which will
probably crest in the next few years, will provide courts with an ideal tool with
which to explain and clarify those categories. No matter which of the speech
highly controversial. . . . Such a distinction, however, is entirely indefensible as a matter of First
Amendment law, however much it might properly motivate Tennessee as a matter of policy.” ACLU of
Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 379 (6th Cir. 2006) (emphasis omitted).
325. Planned Parenthood of South Carolina, Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 795 (4th Cir. 2004)
(Michael, J., writing separately) (“Although the Supreme Court has not yet recognized that speech can
be governmental and private at the same time, its decisions on government speech and viewpoint
discrimination provide instruction on whether the State’s viewpoint discrimination in the license plate
forum can stand.”); id. at 800 (Luttig, J., concurring) (“[S]ome speech acts constitute both private and
government speech, nothwithstanding that the Supreme Court of the United States had not [in 2002]
(and as yet has not) recognized that a single communicative event may be both private speech and
government speech.”).
326. 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (upholding the power of a public television station to exclude a ballot-
qualified candidate from a televised public debate because the debate was a nonpublic forum).
327. 524 U.S. 569, 572 (1998) (upholding NEA’s power to deny grants to artists based in part on a
consideration of “‘decency and respect’ for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public”).
328. See Jacobs, supra note 119, at 70.
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categories and standards described in Part III governs a particular naming rights
arrangement, school boards and other governmental entities driven by the
concerns laid out in Part I must address the gaping holes in policy and practice
described in Part II.
Why do government speech, commercial speech, and forum analysis make
such uneasy bedfellows, and what does that say about the First Amendment?
This Article argues that the three categories trace their origins to fundamentally
different inquiries: Government speech is defined by speaker identity; commer-
cial speech essentially by the speech’s content; and forum analysis by the
speech’s location. Assessing which is better-suited for governing naming rights
is as impossible as the proverbial weighing of a pound of nails against the color
orange. Because the categories arose in response to different questions, establish-
ing boundaries between them is not a simple matter of remapping existing
geography. Fully differentiating between government speech and commercial
speech, for example, will always be impossible so long as the former is defined
by speaker identity and the latter by content. The categories simply fail to
exclude each other. If a governmental unit advertises a product or makes some
other clearly commercial statement—as schools arguably do in the naming
rights context—how should its speech be categorized? This question could
perhaps be answered in part if commercial speech doctrine were to adopt the
reasoning of the Kasky court and classify commercial speech as that coming
from commercial entities. Courts patrolling the boundary between governmental
and commercial speech would then only have to ask who or what was actually
speaking in any given case. But cleaning up that boundary would not necessar-
ily make courts’ jobs any easier—how does one go about identifying “commer-
cial speakers,” for example?—and in any case a move to a speaker-focused First
Amendment jurisprudence would not mesh well with location-focused forum
analysis.
Courts and scholars have thus far seemed content to leave these problematic
areas of First Amendment law rife with confusion, apparently sanguine in the
belief that they are relatively harmless so long as they are quarantined from
each other. But by collapsing this artificial separation, public school naming
rights demand a more comprehensive solution, one which acknowledges and
attempts to resolve the border disputes between these tempestuous but increas-
ingly important categories of speech.
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